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SUMMARY
This doctoral dissertation titled “Product Strategies in Supply Chains,” consists of
three essays. In this dissertation, I study firms’ strategic decisions regarding design
of products and product lines in different supply chain contexts. I focus on firms’
strategic interactions with supply chain members, including consumers and suppliers,
in dynamic environments.
The first essay (Chapter 2) studies how the cost structure of and information
asymmetry about an OEM’s in-house option affect her choice of product design quality
in a decentralized supply chain where the supplier specifies contract terms. The
second essay (Chapter 3) examines the effect of product returns and their potential
refurbishing on intertemporal product strategy and profit of a firm facing strategic
consumers. We also examine the effect of product returns on the time inconsistency
problem faced by the firm. The third essay (Chapter 4) investigates the impact
of competition from a third-party remanufacturer on product strategy and profit of
an OEM in the presence of strategic consumers. Motivated by general perception
among practitioners and the extant literature showing the competition from third-
party remanufacturers as undesirable for the OEM, we specifically examine whether




This doctoral dissertation titled “Product Strategies in Supply Chains,” consists of
three essays. In this dissertation, I study firms’ strategic decisions regarding design
of products and product lines in different supply chain contexts. I focus on firms’
strategic interactions with supply chain members, including consumers and suppliers,
in dynamic environments. The first essay of the dissertation studies the effect of sup-
plier power and information structure on an OEM’s product design decisions. The
other two essays of the dissertation focus on product returns and remanufacturing in
the presence of strategic consumers and competition from third-party remanufactur-
ers. In the following paragraphs, I summarize the research motivations and the main
insights of the essays in the dissertation.
Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) sometimes face the decision of whether
to make an essential component of a product in-house or to source it from a supplier.
Though sourcing from a supplier with a more favorable cost structure than the OEM
could result in higher overall supply-chain profit, the supplier could potentially dictate
contract terms and thus leave a lower share of the profit for the OEM. In the first
essay (Chapter 2), we investigate implications of the relative cost efficiencies of the
supplier and the OEM’s in-house option on the OEM’s choice of product design
quality and subsequent contract outcomes. We model the problem as a dynamic
game, wherein the OEM chooses product design quality in the first stage (determined
by the design quality of a critical component), followed by the supplier offering a
contract for supplying the critical component. The supplier has a more favorable cost
structure than the OEM’s in-house option for manufacturing the critical component.
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Thereafter, the OEM either accepts the supplier’s offer or chooses her in-house option,
and sells the product in the consumer market. Contrary to intuition, the supplier’s
ability to offer a two-part tariff contract need not always benefit the supplier. In fact,
a two-part tariff contract, compared to a price-only contract offered by the supplier,
leaves both the OEM and the supplier worse off when the cost competitiveness of
the OEM’s in-house option is sufficiently low. We also investigate the impact of
information asymmetry regarding the cost structure of the OEM’s in-house option.
Counterintuitively, information asymmetry may be desirable not only for the OEM,
but also for the supplier.
Consumer product returns are a significant and growing concern in many in-
dustries, and firms typically deem returns to be undesirable. Firms may refurbish
these returns to recover value, thereby allowing them to extend their product offering
over time to new and refurbished products. In the second essay (Chapter 3), we
study the impact of returns on the intertemporal product strategy of a firm facing
forward-looking or strategic consumers, who anticipate future availability and prices
of products, and time their purchases to maximize net utility. Using a two-period
model, we find that for sufficiently high return rates, the firm not only offers the refur-
bished product alone in the second period but also refurbishes all of the first-period
returns. Importantly, we show that returns may act as a device for the firm to mit-
igate the well-known time inconsistency problem. Specifically, when the return rate
is sufficiently high, the firm’s incentive to recover value from returns by refurbishing
results in a reduction – and eventually elimination – of the incentive to offer the new
product in the second period. Thus, a sufficiently high return rate allows the firm to
implicitly commit that the new product will be offered exclusively in the first period,
and therefore charge a premium for it. As a result, firm profit could increase with
the return rate.
In line with the general perception among practitioners, the extant literature
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on remanufacturing shows that an OEM’s profit suffers when a third-party reman-
ufacturer competes with the OEM’s remanufacturing operations. Accordingly, the
literature recommends ways to deter third-party competition. However, competition
for used products (or product cores) can influence the price of new products because
strategic (forward-looking) consumers consider the resale value of new products when
making their purchase decisions. In the third essay (Chapter 4), we investigate the
impact of competition from the third-party remanufacturer on the OEM’s profit in
the presence of strategic consumers. Of specific interest is whether competition from
the third-party remanufacturer is always undesirable for the OEM when they face
strategic consumers. In our model, an OEM offers a new product that depreciates
over time. The OEM has an opportunity to acquire and remanufacture depreciated
used products and remarket the remanufactured products. A third-party remanufac-








Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) sometimes face the decision of whether
to make a critical component of a product in-house or source it from a supplier
with superior capability – specifically, lower manufacturing cost for the same design
quality (Walker and Weber 1984, 1987). For example, before introducing its flagship
smartphone – the Galaxy S5 – Samsung had a choice to either make the processor for
the smartphone in-house (Exynos variant) or source the processor from Qualcomm
(Snapdragon variant). This was an important decision for Samsung as the processor
is a critical component in a smartphone. However, there were trade-offs involved in
choosing the source for the processor (Agomuoh 2014). Qualcomm is “the undisputed
king of mobile chips, makes some of the most advanced application processors in the
industry, and is years ahead of its rivals with 4G LTE technology” (Tibken 2014).
Though sourcing from Qualcomm could potentially generate greater total supply-
chain profit when selling to quality-conscious consumers (Eassa 2013), Qualcomm, due
to its dominant position, may leave little profit for Samsung. Alternatively, Samsung
could make the processor in-house to avoid having to share profits (Eassa 2015), but
the total profit generated may be lower. Examples of firms facing such a decision can
be found in other product categories as well. In the automotive sector, automobile
assemblers often decide whether to source a critical component from a more capable
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supplier such as Bosch or make it in-house.1 Suppliers of the kind discussed above are
often in positions to specify contract terms. Other examples include Intel for computer
chips, Samsung for mobile displays, and Magna for automotive powertrains. In the
context of the supply chain contracting literature, Kostamis and Duenyas (2011), Ozer
and Raz (2011), and Ozer and Wei (2006), among others, model supplier-specified
contracts.
In addition to the sourcing decision, OEMs typically have choices with regard to
product design quality. For instance, Samsung had several options in choosing perfor-
mance characteristics of the processor for the Galaxy S5: CPU speed (in GHz), CPU
instruction set, CPU architecture (32-bit or 64-bit), and semiconductor fabrication
technology (expressed in nm). Moreover, product quality may need to be decided be-
fore sourcing contracts are signed (Jerath et al. 2015, Shi et al. 2013). This sequence
of decisions (product quality followed by contracting) creates a trade-off for an OEM
in designing a product. If the OEM designs a high-quality product that only the
supplier can manufacture cost-effectively, total supply-chain profit would be higher
when selling to quality-conscious consumers, but the supplier can extract a larger
share of supply chain profit as the OEM has to rely on the supplier. On the other
hand, if the OEM designs a low-quality product that she too can manufacture at a
reasonable cost, the OEM can retain a larger share of supply chain profit by forcing
the supplier to compete with her in-house option, but total supply-chain profit would
be lower. Thus, the cost structures of the OEM and the supplier can influence both
the choice of product quality and the dynamics of the sourcing contract.
Finally, firms often possess private information about their own capabilities (such
as cost structures), which may help them extract information rent while contracting
with other players in the supply chain. Therefore, in such situations, either firms
1Delphi Automotive for General Motors, Visteon Corporation for Ford Motor Company, and
Denso for Toyota Motor Corporation could be considered in-house options.
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are averse to sharing such information with other players in the supply chain or the
information shared is not credible. If the OEM has private information about the
cost structure of her in-house option, she has an incentive to strategically alter her
choice of product quality, which, in turn, may affect subsequent contract outcomes.
We aim to answer the following research questions for the setting where the OEM
chooses product quality, followed by the supplier deciding contract terms: (1) How do
product quality and supply chain profit in the decentralized supply chain differ from
those in the vertically integrated supply chain when the supplier offers a price-only
contract? How does the cost competitiveness of the OEM’s in-house option impact
product quality and supply chain profits in the decentralized supply chain? (2) How
does a two-part tariff contract, being more sophisticated than a price-only contract,
perform in terms of product quality and supply chain profits? Can a two-part tariff
contract coordinate the supply chain? (3) How does asymmetric information regard-
ing the cost structure of the OEM’s in-house option affect product quality and supply
chain profits?
We investigate these questions by modeling a three-stage dynamic game between
the OEM and the supplier, who has a lower manufacturing cost than the OEM’s
in-house option for the same design quality. In the design stage, the OEM decides
product quality through her choice of performance characteristics of a critical compo-
nent used in the product. In the contract stage, the supplier offers a take-it-or-leave-it
contract to the OEM. In the selling stage, the OEM either accepts or rejects the sup-
plier’s offer and sets the price of the product to be sold to consumers (if the OEM
rejects the supplier’s offer, she makes the component in-house instead of sourcing it
from the supplier). We contrast two scenarios: complete information and asymmet-
ric information. In the complete information scenario, we consider two contracts: a
price-only contract and a two-part tariff contract. We examine the price-only contract
because this contract is a simple and common mechanism governing transactions in
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supply chains (Bresnahan and Reiss 1985, Perakis and Roels 2007). We also examine
a two-part tariff contract because this contract has commonly been shown to coor-
dinate supply chains (Cachon and Kok 2010, Cachon and Lariviere 2005). In the
asymmetric information scenario, the OEM has private information about the cost
structure of her in-house option. Our analysis generates the following main insights:
1. Under the price-only contract, we find that the double marginalization problem
may manifest in the form of the OEM choosing lower product quality rather
than lower sales quantity. In particular, if the competitiveness of the OEM’s in-
house option is sufficiently high, the supply chain is coordinated in terms of sales
quantity but not in terms of product quality. However, if the competitiveness of
the OEM’s in-house option is relatively low, the supply chain is coordinated in
terms of product quality but not in terms of sales quantity. Moreover, product
quality, supplier profit, and total supply-chain profit are nonmonotonic in the
competitiveness of the OEM’s in-house option.
2. Contrary to intuition, we find that the supplier’s ability to offer a two-part
tariff contract2, compared to the price-only contract, may hurt not only the
OEM (as expected) but also the supplier. Specifically, if the competitiveness
of the OEM’s in-house option is sufficiently low, the two-part tariff contract –
compared to the price-only contract – leaves both the OEM and the supplier
worse off. The reason is that the supplier’s ability to offer the two-part tariff
contract induces the OEM to strategically choose low product quality, which,
in turn, lowers total supply-chain profit.
3. Under certain conditions, both the OEM and the supplier – the less-informed
player – earn higher expected profits under asymmetric cost information than
2The ability of a supplier to offer a two-part tariff contract (compared to the price-only contract)
has been typically shown to result in supply chain coordination and the supplier extracting a larger
share of the total supply-chain profit.
7
under complete information. The reason is that, under asymmetric information,
the supplier is unable to perfectly discriminate between a high-cost OEM and a
low-cost OEM. The result is that the high-cost OEM may choose higher quality
under asymmetric information, leading to higher supply chain profits. This
finding is counterintuitive given that the extant literature generally shows that
asymmetric information results in: (a) the less-informed player being worse off,
and (b) supply chain inefficiency. Thus, we show that asymmetric information
may not necessarily be detrimental to the less-informed player in a decentralized
supply chain when firms make decisions in a dynamic setting.
2.2. Literature Review
Our paper contributes to four streams of research in the supply chain literature:
(i) contracting in decentralized supply chains, (ii) product design quality in supply
chains, (iii) supply chain sourcing, and (iv) asymmetric information in supply chains.
In a decentralized supply chain, under simple contracts such as a price-only con-
tract, players often have conflicting interests and thus make decisions that are not
supply-chain-optimal (Perakis and Roels 2007, Spengler 1950). Consequently, the
problem of double marginalization occurs in which a supplier and a buyer in a de-
centralized supply chain produce and sell less than the vertically integrated firm
(Bresnahan and Reiss 1985). The supply chain contracting literature suggests vari-
ous mechanisms such as two-part tariffs and buybacks to induce the buyer to order
and sell more (Cachon 2003, Tsay et al. 1999). However, this literature has largely
considered product design quality as exogenous.
Papers within the contracting literature that consider product design quality as
an endogenous decision include Economides (1999), Jerath et al. (2015), Jeuland and
Shugan (2008), Shi et al. (2013), and Xu (2009). We study the setting where the
downstream player (OEM) decides both product quality and sales quantity taking
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into account the contract terms specified by the upstream player (supplier). Our
paper is different in that we focus on a supply chain structure where the OEM has
an in-house option. Further, we consider asymmetric cost information between the
OEM and supplier.
The literature on supply chain sourcing strategies focuses on the manufacturer’s
(buyer’s) problem of how to select suppliers, award contracts, and allocate procure-
ment among them. Elmaghraby (2000a) provides an excellent review of earlier work
in the field of Operations Management (OM) and Economics on supplier competi-
tion and sourcing strategies. Lovejoy (2010) considers the context of a monopolist
bringing a new product to market through a multi-tier supply chain with horizontal
competition among firms in each tier. Arya et al. (2008) focus on strategic considera-
tions that can influence sourcing decisions and show that, in the presence of rivals, a
firm may buy an input for a price even above its in-house cost of production. Novak
and Eppinger (2001) study the impact of product complexity on whether to make a
component in-house or buy from an external supplier. Our paper is similar in the
sense that the buying firm has more than one sourcing options to choose from. How-
ever, we endogenize product quality, consider the setting where the supplier specifies
contract terms, and also allow for asymmetric information between the supply chain
players.
Finally, our work is also related to the literature that examines the effect of asym-
metric information in supply chains. Models in the supply chain literature that con-
sider asymmetric information can be classified according to: (a) the parameter for
which there is asymmetric information, such as cost or demand, and (b) whether it is
a signaling (informed player moving first) or a screening (uninformed player moving
first) problem (Chen 2003, Laffont and Martimort 2002). Our work studies a signal-
ing problem in the presence of asymmetric cost information. Papers that consider
9
sourcing contracts with asymmetric cost information include Corbett (2001), Cor-
bett et al. (2004), Corbett and de Groote (2000), Ha (2001), Iyer et al. (2005), Kaya
and Ozer (2009), Kim and Netessine (2013), Kostamis and Duenyas (2011), and Li
and Debo (2009). Like our paper, Corbett (2001), Corbett et al. (2004), Ha (2001),
and Kostamis and Duenyas (2011) model the downstream player (the OEM in our
case) with private cost information. Signaling problems in the OM literature examine
equilibria that allow a firm to credibly share her private demand information with
another supply chain player and increase overall profit (Cachon and Lariviere 2001,
Ha and Tong 2008, Ozer and Wei 2006). In contrast, we study a signaling problem
in which the OEM signals her cost structure to the supplier through her choice of
product quality.
2.3. Model and Assumptions
2.3.1 Supply Chain
We consider a two-tier supply chain comprising an OEM and a supplier, who are
profit-maximizing and risk-neutral. The sequence of decisions is shown in Figure
1. In the first stage (Jerath et al. 2015, Shi et al. 2013) – the design stage – the
OEM decides product quality q, defined as a one-dimensional measure of the stream
of value that can be derived from the product over its lifetime. For simplicity, we
assume that one critical component determines overall product quality. The OEM
can either manufacture the component using her in-house option or source it from
the supplier through a supply contract (we henceforth use the terms “component”
and “product” interchangeably). Let o and s denote the OEM and the supplier,
respectively. We assume that product quality is observable and contractible. We also
assume that the marginal cost of production for a product of quality q is ciq
2, where
ci is an exogenously given cost parameter for player i ∈ {o, s} (Shi et al. 2013). We
denote the ratio of the cost parameters by k = co/cs, which reflects the relative cost
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competitiveness of the supplier vis--vis the OEM (or vice versa).
In the second stage – the contract stage – the supplier, who is in a position to
specify contract terms, offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the OEM for supplying
the product (Kostamis and Duenyas 2011, Ozer and Raz 2011, Ozer and Wei 2006).
We assume that the contracting process is a one-shot interaction. We consider two
types of contracts: a price-only contract and a two-part tariff contract. The price-
only contract specifies a per-unit wholesale price w charged by the supplier to the
OEM. The two-part tariff contract specifies a per unit price w and a lump-sum fee f .
To focus on non-trivial cases, we assume that the supplier is more cost competitive
than the OEM (i.e., k > 1) and that the supplier’s reservation profit is lower than the
profit he can earn by contracting with the OEM. For exposition, we set the supplier’s
reservation profit to zero.
In the third stage – the selling stage – the OEM either accepts or rejects the
supplier’s offer and sets the selling price p charged to consumers (or, equivalently,
sells Q units of the product).3 If the OEM accepts the supplier’s offer, she sources
the product from the supplier; else the OEM manufactures the product using her
in-house option.
We investigate and contrast two scenarios: complete information and asymmetric
information. In the asymmetric information scenario (§2.5), the OEM has private
information about the cost structure of her in-house option while the supplier knows
it only probabilistically.
2.3.2 Consumers
We assume that consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for quality.
We denote this characteristic of consumers by θ. Specifically, a consumer of type θ
is willing to pay at most θq for a product of quality q. For simplicity, we assume
3Since we assume demand to be deterministic, the price charged by the OEM to consumers has
a one-to-one relationship with the sales quantity of the product.
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OEM accepts










Design Stage Contract Stage
Timeline
Figure 1: Sequence of Decisions
that θ is uniformly distributed between zero and one. We normalize the market size
to one. Furthermore, each consumer buys at most one unit of the product. The net
utility that a consumer of type θ obtains from a product of quality q purchased at
price p is uθ = θq− p (Economides 1999, Jerath et al. 2015, Shi et al. 2013). Being a
net-utility-maximizer, a consumer of type θ buys the product if and only if θq−p ≥ 0.






2.3.3 Benchmark: Integrated Supply Chain
We first establish the optimal decisions for the vertically integrated supply chain in
which the OEM and the supplier are owned by a single, integrated firm that jointly
sets the quality and price of the product to maximize total supply-chain profit. Since










We denote the solution for the integrated firm by superscript I. In Appendix A.2, we
summarize our notation for the model parameters (Table 11) and for the equilibrium
solutions for each scenario discussed in the paper (Table 3). Proposition 1 summarizes
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the integrated firm’s optimal product quality, sales quantity, and profit, which we use
as a benchmark for comparison with the decentralized supply chain. All proofs are
included in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1. For the integrated supply chain, the optimal (a) product quality qI =
1
3cs
, (b) sales quantity QI = 1
3
and (c) firm profit ΠI = 1
27cs
.
2.4. Contracting under Complete Information
In this section, we consider the contracting problem under complete information. At
every stage of the game, each player has complete information about previous moves
and payoff functions. We consider two types of contracts: the price-only contract
and the two-part tariff contract. We consider the price-only contract because this
contract is a simple and common mechanism governing transactions in supply chains
(Bresnahan and Reiss 1985, Perakis and Roels 2007). We also examine the two-part
tariff contract because this contract has commonly been shown to coordinate supply
chains (Cachon and Kok 2010, Cachon and Lariviere 2005). We examine how product
quality, sales quantity, and supply chain profits in the decentralized supply chain differ
from those in the vertically integrated supply chain for both contract types and also
compare the performance of the two contracts. For the decentralized supply chain,
we denote the profits of the OEM, the supplier, and the total supply chain by Πo, Πs,
and Πt (= Πo + Πs), respectively.
2.4.1 Price-Only Contract
In this section, we consider the case in which the supplier offers a price-only contract
characterized by a per-unit wholesale price w charged by the supplier to the OEM.
We solve the problem by backward induction, beginning with the selling stage.
Selling Stage The OEM’s problem in the selling stage is to decide whether to
accept or reject the contract offered by the supplier and set the selling price p (or,
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equivalently, sales quantity Q) to maximize her profit for given quality q and wholesale
price w. If the OEM rejects the offer, she manufactures the product using her in-
house option. Henceforth, we refer to the profit earned by the OEM when she uses
her in-house option, as her reservation profit. Note that the OEM’s reservation profit
in our model depends on product quality and is, thus, endogenous. In the selling
stage, for given q and w, the OEM solves the following optimization problem:
max
p|{q,w}

















if OEM uses in-house option.
(2.4.2)








if OEM accepts contract,
0 if OEM uses in-house option.
The solution of the OEM’s problem (2.4.2) is summarized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For given product quality q and wholesale price w, the OEM’s best re-
sponse is to:
(a) enter into the contract with the supplier and set p∗ = q+w
2
if w ≤ kcsq2;
(b) manufacture using her in-house option and set p∗ = q+kcsq
2
2
if w > kcsq
2.










Contract Stage In the contract stage, the supplier’s problem is to maximize
his profit by choosing the wholesale price after taking into account the OEM’s best
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response in the selling stage. Since we focus on situations where the supplier’s reser-
vation profit is less than the profit he can earn by contracting with the OEM, the
supplier offers the contract with wholesale price not greater than the marginal cost
of the OEM’s in-house option, i.e., w ≤ kcsq2. Thus, the supplier’s optimization













s.t. w ≤ kcsq2.
(2.4.4)
Lemma 2. For given product quality q, the supplier’s best response is to choose
wholesale price w∗ such that:
(a) w∗ = kcsq
2 if q < 1
(2k−1)cs ;
(b) w∗ = q+csq
2
2
if q ≥ 1
(2k−1)cs .
Lemma 2 states that if the product quality chosen by the OEM is above a thresh-
old, the supplier sets wholesale price w∗ = q+csq
2
2
. On the other hand, if the product
quality chosen by the OEM is below this threshold, the supplier sets the wholesale
price such that the OEM is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the contract
(i.e., w∗ = kcsq
2). While in the latter case, the OEM earns only her reservation profit,
in the former case she earns profit greater than or equal to her reservation profit.
The total supply-chain profit at the supplier’s optimal wholesale price w∗ for a














(1− csq)2 if q ≥
1
(2k − 1) cs
.
(2.4.5)
If product quality were exogenous, the integrated firm’s profit would be ΠI (q) =
q
4
(1− csq)2 . Clearly Π∗t (q) < ΠI (q), implying that if product quality were exoge-
nous, the price-only contract would not coordinate the supply chain. This conclusion
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is consistent with the classic result in the supply chain literature that price-only
contracts do not coordinate supply chains.
Design Stage In the design stage, the OEM sets product quality taking into ac-
count the supplier’s best response in the contract stage. Using superscript P to denote
the optimal solution under the price-only contract, the OEM’s optimization problem







(1− kcsq)2 s.t. q <
1






(1− csq)2 s.t. q ≥
1
(2k − 1) cs
.
(2.4.6)
Lemma 3. Under the price-only contract:





, and ΠPs =
k−1
27k2cs
for k < 4;





, and ΠPs =
1
54cs





≤ 0 for all k;
(d) ΠPs |k<4 < ΠPs |k≥4,
∂ΠPs
∂k





Lemma 3 shows how the competitiveness of the OEM’s in-house option relative to
the supplier affects product quality and profits when the supplier offers the price-only
contract. Regardless of the OEM’s competitiveness, under complete information, the
OEM and the supplier enter into the contract and manufacturing is performed by
the more cost-efficient player – the supplier. The OEM’s profit can be expressed as
ΠPo = q
PMPo Q
P , where MPo is OEM’s margin per unit quality per unit quantity (see
Table 4 in Appendix A.2). Similarly, the supplier’s profit is ΠPs = q
PMPs Q
P , where
MPs is supplier’s margin per unit quality per unit quantity.
Since the OEM chooses product quality before she enters into the contract with the




































Suppy Chain Profits Product Quality & Sales Quantity
Figure 2: Complete Information: Price-Only Contract (cs = 1)
supply-chain profit. If the OEM chooses the lower quality, she can retain a higher







is forced to compete with the OEM’s in-house option and, thus, to offer a competi-
tive wholesale price. On the other hand, if the OEM chooses the higher quality, the
supplier would set a higher wholesale price, which, in turn, would result in a lower






. As a result, the
optimal product quality (see Figure 2) is non-monotonic in the OEM’s competitive-
ness. In particular, when the OEM’s competitiveness is sufficiently low (k ≥ 4), the
OEM chooses higher quality than when it is sufficiently high (k < 4).
Furthermore, the supplier’s profit is significantly lower for k < 4 than for k ≥ 4.
This is because when the OEM’s competitiveness is sufficiently high (k < 4), the
OEM, in order to retain a higher margin, chooses lower product quality, which shrinks
total supply-chain profit. Further, the supplier’s profit is non-monotonic in k for
k < 4, first increasing and then decreasing in k, and peaking at k = 2. This is
because the competitiveness of the OEM’s in-house option influences the supplier’s
profit through two countervailing forces: as the OEM’s competitiveness decreases (i.e.,
k increases), the supplier is able to retain a higher proportion of the total supply-
chain profit; however, the OEM chooses decreasing product quality to maximize her
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(endogenous) reservation profit, which, in turn, reduces total supply-chain profit.
Effectively, for 2 < k < 4, the profits of both the OEM and the supplier decrease with
k.
Proposition 2 contrasts the performance of the decentralized supply chain under
the price-only contract with that of the integrated firm (§2.3.3).
Proposition 2. Comparison of the performance of the decentralized supply chain
under the price-only contract with that of the integrated firm:
(a) qP < qI and QP = QI for k < 4;
(b) qP = qI and QP < QI for k ≥ 4;
(c) ΠPt < Π
I for all k.
As expected, we find that the price-only contract does not coordinate the supply
chain (i.e., ΠPt < Π
I). Given the two decisions (product quality and sales quantity)
made in our supply chain context, there are multiple degrees of coordination or lack
thereof. For our context, where product quality is an endogenous decision and the
OEM has an in-house option, the classic double marginalization problem may man-
ifest in the form of the OEM choosing lower product quality rather than lower sales
quantity.
The OEM lowers either product quality or sales quantity depending on the com-
petitiveness of her in-house option. When her competitiveness is sufficiently low (i.e.,









. The reason for the OEM
not lowering the quality is that her in-house option is so inferior that she relies on
the supplier for manufacturing the product and, hence, chooses product quality that
maximizes total supply-chain profit. In contrast, when her competitiveness is suffi-










OEM chooses the lower quality because it maximizes her reservation profit.
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2.4.2 Two-part Tariff Contract
In this section, we consider the scenario in which the supplier offers a two-part tariff
contract {w, f}, where w is the per-unit price and f is the lump-sum fee. We examine
whether the two-part tariff contract, being more sophisticated than the price-only
contract, can improve the performance of the supply chain – including whether the
two-part tariff contract can coordinate the supply chain, as has been shown in the
supply chain literature (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). The sequence of decisions is
the same as that shown in Figure 1. We solve the problem by backward induction,
beginning with the selling stage.
Selling Stage The OEM’s problem in the selling stage is to set the selling price (or
equivalently, sales quantity) to maximize her profit for given quality q and contract





















if OEM uses in-house option.
(2.4.7)
The resulting profit for the supplier is







+ f if OEM accepts contract,
0 if OEM uses in-house option.
(2.4.8)
The optimal solution of (2.4.7) is the same as that expressed in Lemma 1 in §2.4.1
because the best response p∗ of the OEM in the selling stage does not depend on the
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lump-sum fee f . At the optimal price p∗, the OEM’s profit for given q, w, and f is








− f︸ ︷︷ ︸
accepting contract
,





























where the constraint is that the OEM must not be worse off if she accepts the contract.
Lemma 4. For given product quality q, the supplier’s best response is to offer a two-




Regardless of the OEM’s choice of product quality in the design stage, under the
two-part tariff contract, the supplier sets the per-unit price equal to his own marginal
cost and the lump-sum fee such that the OEM is only left with her reservation profit
(i.e., the profit from using her in-house option). Note that, for given q, Π∗t (q) =
q
4
(1− csq)2 = ΠI (q), implying that if product quality were exogenous, the two-part
tariff contract would coordinate the supply chain. This conclusion is consistent with
the classic result in the supply chain literature that two-part tariff contracts can
coordinate supply chains (Cachon and Lariviere 2005). In a two-part tariff contract,
a supplier achieves coordination through marginal-cost pricing, and the lump-sum fee
helps allocate profits between the OEM and the supplier. However, we show that this
classic result may not hold when the contract is offered (by the supplier, in our case)
subsequent to product quality being chosen by the offeree (the OEM, in our case).
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Design Stage We use superscript 2P to denote the optimal solution under the two-






(1− kcsq)2 . (2.4.10)
Lemma 5. Under the two-part tariff contract:
q2P = 1
3kcs











Proposition 3 compares the performance of the two-part tariff contract, the price-
only contract, and the integrated supply chain.
Proposition 3. Comparisons among the performance of the price-only contract, the
two-part tariff contract, and the integrated supply chain:
(a) q2P = qP < qI for k < 4 and q2P < qP = qI for k ≥ 4;
(b) Q2P > QP = QI for k < 4 and Q2P > QI > QP for k ≥ 4;
(c) Π2Po = Π
P




o for k ≥ 4;
(d) Π2Ps > Π
P




s for k ≥ 4;
(e) ΠI > Π2Pt > Π
P
t for k < 4 and Π
I > ΠPt > Π
2P
t for k ≥ 4.
Clearly, the two-part tariff contract fails to achieve product quality coordination,
i.e., the product quality chosen by the OEM is always less than that chosen by the
integrated firm. As a result, the total supply-chain profit under the two-part tariff
contract is always less than the profit of the integrated supply chain. However, the
sales quantity under the two-part tariff contract exceeds that of the integrated firm;
the two contract parameters available to the supplier enable him to induce the OEM
to choose a higher quantity in order to compensate for the lower product quality.4
4Under the two-part tariff contract, we have w∗ = csq





4 and Lemma 1(a)), which yields the following relationship: 2Q∗ +csq
∗ = 1. Thus, the optimal sales
quantity and product quality are partial substitutes. If the quality chosen by the OEM is lower, the
supplier offers the contract such that it induces the OEM to order a higher quantity.
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As expected, the two-part tariff contract helps the supplier earn higher profit
(leading to higher total supply-chain profit) than the price-only contract for k < 4.
The reason is that when k < 4, the two-part tariff contract induces the OEM to choose
a higher sales quantity but the same product quality as in the price-only contract,
thereby resulting in a higher total supply-chain profit. Compared to the price-only
contract, the two-part tariff contract provides the supplier an additional degree of
freedom in retaining all supply chain profits other than the reservation profit of the
OEM.
𝒌

















Suppy Chain Profits Product Quality & Sales Quantity
Figure 3: Complete Information: Two-Part Tariff Contract (cs = 1)
A key result in the supply chain coordination literature is that price-only contracts
lead to non-supply-chain-optimal decisions in the supply chain (i.e., double marginal-
ization), and more sophisticated contracts – such as a two-part tariff contract – can
be employed by the supplier to improve supply chain performance (Cachon and Kok
2010). Further, the more sophisticated contracts are typically known as working to
the advantage of the offeror (the supplier, in our case) and to the likely disadvantage
of the offeree (the OEM, in our case).
However, in the presence of the OEM’s in-house option and endogenous product
quality, the two-part tariff contract may not always improve total supply-chain profit,
22
nor the supplier’s profit, compared to the price-only contract. In fact, the two-
part tariff contract, compared to the price-only contract, leaves not only the OEM
but also the supplier worse off if the competitiveness of the OEM is sufficiently low
(k ≥ 4).5 The reason for this counterintuitive result is as follows. Under the two-
part tariff contract, the supplier sets the price equal to his own marginal cost, and
the lump-sum fee such that the OEM is only left with her reservation profit. The
OEM takes into account the supplier’s incentive to leave – through the lump-sum fee
– only her reservation profit and therefore chooses product quality that maximizes
this (endogenous) reservation profit. The end result when k ≥ 4 is that the OEM
chooses lower product quality (as compared to the price-only contract), which shrinks
total supply-chain profit, effectively hurting both the OEM and the supplier. Thus,
in the presence of the OEM’s in-house option and endogenous product quality, the
supplier’s ability to offer a two-part tariff contract could prove to be detrimental for
the supplier himself.
2.5. Contracting under Asymmetric Information
In this section, we examine the impact of asymmetric information about the cost
structure of the OEM’s in-house option on product quality and supply chain profits.
The supplier’s cost parameter cs is common knowledge but the OEM’s cost parameter
co(= kjcs) is private information to the OEM. The supplier, however, has a proba-
bilistic prior belief about the value of kj. For analytical tractability, we assume that
kj assumes one of two values: kl (low) or kh (high), where kh > kl. We restrict our
attention to the price-only contract with kj < 4, so as to focus on scenarios where
the OEM’s in-house option is reasonably competitive. We denote a variable x in the
asymmetric information scenario by x̃, where x ∈ {q, w, p,Q,Πo,Πs,Πt}.
5Cachon and Kok (2010), in a different supply chain context, find that a two-part tariff contract
can leave competing manufacturers (suppliers) worse off and the retailer better off than a price-only
contract. We show that both supply chain tiers may be worse off under a two-part tariff contract
compared to a price-only contract.
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The supplier believes that the cost parameter of the OEM is either khcs with prob-
ability α or klcs with probability (1− α). We refer to the OEM with cost parameter
khcs as the high-cost OEM and the OEM with cost parameter klcs as the low-cost
OEM.
We model the game of asymmetric information by introducing a prior move by
nature that determines the OEM’s type. In the transformed game, nature moves first
and decides the OEM’s type. In the design stage, the OEM sets product quality, which
may signal her cost structure. The supplier observes the OEM’s choice of product
quality and updates his beliefs about the OEM’s cost structure. In the contract
stage, the supplier offers a price-only contract. In the selling stage, the OEM either
accepts the contract or manufactures the product using her in-house option and sets
the selling price of the product.
Let Π̃jo [q̃, w̃] and Π̃
j
s [q̃, w̃] denote the profits of the OEM and the supplier, respec-
tively, when the supplier faces OEM type j ∈ {h, l}, the OEM chooses quality q̃, the
supplier offers the contract with wholesale price w̃, and the OEM optimally sets the
selling price p̃. Also, let Π̃o [q̃, w̃], Π̃s [q̃, w̃] and Π̃t [q̃, w̃] denote the expected profits
of the OEM, the supplier, and the (total) supply chain. Let Pr (a|b) denote the con-
ditional probability of event a occurring given that event b has already occurred. We
find the equilibria of this sequential game by using the solution concept of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE is a set of strategies and beliefs such that, at
any stage of the game, the chosen strategies are optimal given the beliefs, and the
beliefs, in turn, are consistent with the optimal strategies.
Selling Stage In the selling stage, for given q̃ and w̃, the OEM’s optimal selling
price is the same as that expressed in Lemma 1 in §2.4.1. Note that in the selling
stage, the OEM makes her price decision with complete information. Hence, the
solution for this stage has to only be subgame perfect. Similar to (2.4.3) in §2.4.1,
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the optimal profit of OEM type j for given q̃ and w̃ is









Contract Stage If the supplier had complete information about the cost structure
of the OEM’s in-house option and given that we restrict our analysis to kj < 4, it
would be optimal for the supplier to offer a contract with w̃ = klcsq̃
2 to the low-cost
OEM and with w̃ = khcsq̃
2 to the high-cost OEM (note that Lemma 2(a) in §2.4.1
applies under complete information when kj < 4). However, the supplier might not
know which type of OEM he is facing. The supplier observes the OEM’s choice of
product quality and updates his beliefs about the OEM’s cost structure in accordance
with Bayes’ rule. Let Pr (kh|q̃) be the supplier’s posterior (updated) belief that the
OEM is high-cost and Pr (kl|q̃) be his posterior belief that the OEM is low-cost, given
that the OEM has chosen quality q̃ in the design stage. For given quality and the
supplier’s posterior beliefs, there are two possibilities. First, that the supplier sets a
low wholesale price w̃ ≤ klcsq̃2 and both the high- and low-cost OEMs contract with
the supplier. Second, that the supplier sets a high wholesale price klcsq̃
2 < w̃ ≤ khcsq̃2
and only the high-cost OEM contracts with the supplier. Neither OEM type contracts
with the supplier if w̃ > khcsq̃
2. Thus, the supplier’s optimization problem in the


























2 < w̃ ≤ khcsq̃2.
(2.5.12)















the contract stage, the supplier’s optimal strategy for given q̃ is to offer the price-only
contract at either w̃h (q̃) or w̃l (q̃) or a mix of both.
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Note that w̃h and w̃l are functions of the quality (q̃) chosen by the OEM. For
brevity, we henceforth use w̃h and w̃l to imply w̃h (q̃) and w̃l (q̃), respectively. Note
that w̃l ≤ w̃h. The optimal strategy of the supplier depends on the OEM’s choice of
product quality and the resulting posterior belief about the OEM’s type.
Design Stage Taking into account the supplier’s best response w̃∗ ⊆ {w̃h, w̃l} in
the contract stage, the high- and low-cost OEMs’ respective optimization problems

















Pr (w̃h|q̃) Π̃lo [q̃, w̃h] + Pr (w̃l|q̃) Π̃lo [q̃, w̃l]
)
, (2.5.14)
where Pr (w̃h|q̃) and Pr (w̃l|q̃) are the conditional probabilities of the supplier offering








. Since kh > kl, we refer to q̃h as low quality and q̃l as
high quality. Further, let w̃ll = klcsq̃
2
l , w̃hh = khcsq̃
2











Substituting for q̃h and q̃l, we get: w̃ll =
1
9klcs


























when kh ≥ 3kl+12 . Thus, we have
w̃hl > w̃ll. We therefore refer to w̃hl as high wholesale price and w̃ll as low wholesale
price when the OEM chooses high quality q̃l. Lemma 7 refines the strategy spaces of
the OEM and the supplier.
Lemma 7. (a) In the design stage, the OEM’s optimal strategy space is
{{q̃l, q̃h}|kh, q̃l|kl}.
(b) In the contract stage, Pr (w̃hh|q̃h) = 1.
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Lemma 7(a) states that, in the design stage, the optimal strategy of the high-
cost OEM is to choose either low quality (q̃h) or high quality (q̃l) or a mix of both,
whereas the optimal strategy of the low-cost OEM is to always choose high quality.
The high-cost OEM has an incentive to choose high quality over low quality because
she earns a higher profit if the supplier happens to charge low wholesale price (w̃ll)
on observing high quality, i.e., Π̃ho [q̃l, w̃ll] > Π̃
h
o [q̃h, w̃hh]. However, she also faces the
risk of earning a lower profit if the supplier happens to charge high wholesale price
(w̃hl) on observing high quality, i.e., Π̃
h
o [q̃l, w̃hl] < Π̃
h
o [q̃h, w̃hh].
Lemma 7(b) states that, in the contract stage, offering wholesale price w̃hh is a
strictly dominant strategy for the supplier given that the OEM has chosen low quality
(q̃h) in the design stage. This is so because the supplier would know with certainty
that he is facing a high-cost OEM.
The supplier faces a tradeoff on observing high quality (q̃l). If the supplier offers
the contract with high wholesale price and the OEM turns out to be high-cost, the
supplier gets the contract and earns Π̃hs [q̃l, w̃hl]; however, if the OEM turns out to
be low-cost, the supplier fails to get the contract. On the other hand, if the supplier
offers the contract with low wholesale price, the supplier gets the contract regardless
of OEM type, and earns Π̃hs [q̃l, w̃ll] if the OEM turns out to be high-cost and Π̃
l
s [q̃l, w̃ll]
if the OEM turns out to be low-cost. Since Π̃hs [q̃l, w̃hl] > Π̃
h
s [q̃l, w̃ll] = Π̃
l
s [q̃l, w̃ll] (see
Table 6 in Appendix A.2), the supplier faces a trade-off on observing high quality
(q̃l): either offer high wholesale price but with the risk of not getting the contract, or
offer low wholesale price but with the certainty of getting the contract.
2.5.1 Equilibria
We denote the probability of the high-cost OEM choosing low quality (q̃h) by β and
high quality (q̃l) by (1− β), i.e., Pr (q̃h|kh) = β and Pr (q̃l|kh) = (1− β). Also, given
that the OEM has chosen high quality (q̃l), we denote the probability of the supplier
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offering high wholesale price (w̃hl) by γ and low wholesale price (w̃ll) by (1− γ), i.e.,
Pr (w̃hl|q̃l) = γ and Pr (w̃ll|q̃l) = (1− γ).
After eliminating implausible equilibria, the extensive form of the quality-signaling
game is shown in Figure 4. Table 6 (see Appendix A.2) summarizes the profits of
the OEM and the supplier for all plausible equilibria of the game. Note that if the
supplier offers high wholesale price (w̃hl) on observing high quality (q̃l) and the OEM
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Figure 4: Extensive Form Game
Given his prior beliefs, the supplier’s problem, on observing high quality (q̃l), is
to determine the probability distribution over his set of actions w̃hl and w̃ll so as to







α (1− β) Π̃hs [q̃l, w̃hl] + (1− α) Π̃ls [q̃l, w̃hl]
]
if w̃∗ = w̃hl,
(1− γ)
[
α (1− β) Π̃hs [q̃l, w̃ll] + (1− α) Π̃ls [q̃l, w̃ll]
]
if w̃∗ = w̃ll.
(2.5.15)
Similarly, the high-cost OEM’s problem is to determine the probability distribution
over her set of actions q̃h and q̃l, taking into account the supplier’s best response in








γΠ̃ho [q̃l, w̃hl] + (1− γ) Π̃ho [q̃l, w̃ll]
)
if q̃∗ = q̃l.
(2.5.16)
We find the PBEs for the game by solving equations (2.5.15) and (2.5.16) simul-
taneously. As shown in Proposition 4, we find two PBEs: a pooling equilibrium
and a semiseparating equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Define X = 2kl(kl−1)
(kh−1)(3kl−kh)


























, and ζm2 =
{





Under asymmetric information about the cost structure of the OEM’s in-house
option, following are the equilibria and optimal strategy profiles for the OEM and the
supplier:
(a) For ζp, a pooling equilibrium occurs in which both the low-cost and high-cost
OEMs’ strategy is to choose high quality (q̃l) and the supplier’s strategy is to offer low
wholesale price (w̃ll) if he observes high quality (q̃l) and to offer wholesale price w̃hh
if he observes low quality (q̃h);
6Recall that choosing low quality (q̃h) is the truth-telling strategy for the high-cost OEM. Sim-
ilarly, choosing high quality (q̃l) is the truth-telling strategy for the low-cost OEM. In contrast to
the high-cost OEM, the low-cost OEM does not have an incentive to deviate from her truth-telling
strategy.
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(b) For ζm1∪ζm2, a semiseparating equilibrium occurs. The low-cost OEM’s strategy
is to choose high quality (q̃l). The high-cost OEM’s strategy is to choose low quality
(q̃h) with probability β
∗ and high quality (q̃l) with probability (1 − β∗), where β∗ =
α−X
α(1−X) for ζm1 and β
∗ = α−Y
α(1−Y ) for ζm2. The supplier’s strategy is to offer wholesale
price w̃hh if he observes low quality (q̃h), and to offer high wholesale price (w̃hl) with
probability γ∗ and low wholesale price (w̃ll) with probability (1 − γ∗) if he observes
































α = 0.5 kl = 2.0
Figure 5: Parameter Settings where the Pooling or the Semiseparating Equilibrium
Occurs
Figure 5 illustrates parameter settings where the pooling or the semiseparating
equilibrium occurs. Which of the equilibria occurs can be explained by whether the
supplier, on observing high quality, has an incentive to set high wholesale price. If
the supplier sets high – rather than low – wholesale price, he gets a higher margin
but risks either losing the contract with the low-cost OEM or inducing the high-cost
OEM to choose a lower sales quantity. When the difference between the costs of the
high-cost OEM and the low-cost OEM (i.e., kh − kl) is relatively low, the increase in
the supplier’s margin (from setting high wholesale price) is too low to compensate for
the risk of either losing the contract or facing a decreased sales quantity, effectively
resulting in the pooling equilibrium. However, when difference between kh and kl
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is above a threshold value, the increase in the supplier’s margin (from setting high
wholesale price) outweighs the aforementioned risk, resulting in the semiseparating
equilibrium. Moreover, the higher the probability (α) of the OEM being high-cost,
the lower are the odds of the supplier losing the contract when he sets high wholesale
price. Therefore, the semiseparating equilibrium occurs above a threshold value of α
(for given kh and kl).
Proposition 5 outlines the impact of asymmetric information on product quality
and profits in the decentralized supply chain, as compared to the scenario of com-
plete information. As in Corbett et al. (2004) and Kaya and Ozer (2009), to enable
the comparison, we denote the expected values of product quality and supply chain
profits under complete information as follows: qPE = αqP (kh) + (1−α)qP (kl), ΠPEo =







For the asymmetric information scenario, we label the expected7 equilibrium values
of variables by superscript A.
Proposition 5. Asymmetric information about the OEM’s cost structure (under the
price-only contract), as compared to the scenario of complete information, results in:





















if (kh − 1) (kl − 1) > 1; Π̃As ≤ ΠPEs
otherwise;






under the pooling equilib-
rium or if
(kh − 1) (kl − 1) > 1; Π̃At ≤ Π
PE
t otherwise;
(e) the possibility that contracting might not occur between the low-cost OEM and the
7We use the term “expected” because the players’ moves are probabilistic in the semiseparating
equilibrium.
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Figure 6: Regions of Expected Profit Increase under
Asymmetric Information as compared to Complete Information (α = 0.5)
supplier.
In the complete information scenario (with k < 4), the OEM does not choose
a higher quality than her reservation-profit-maximizing quality because the supplier,
knowing the cost of the OEM’s in-house option, would then charge a higher wholesale
price, which would leave the OEM worse off. However, in the asymmetric informa-
tion scenario, the high-cost OEM chooses a higher quality than her reservation-profit-
maximizing quality – with certainty in the pooling equilibrium and with a positive
probability (1− β∗) in the semiseparating equilibrium. Thus, expected product qual-
ity is higher under asymmetric information than under complete information (Propo-
sition 5(a)).
While it is expected that the OEM may benefit from asymmetric information
about her cost structure (Proposition 5(b)), under certain conditions, asymmetric
information results in an increase in expected total supply-chain profit (Proposition
5(d); see Figures 6 and 7). This finding is in contrast to the supply chain literature
that typically shows that asymmetric information leads to a loss of supply-chain
efficiency (Chen 2003, Corbett 2001, Corbett et al. 2004, Ha 2001, Kaya and Ozer
2009). A nuanced exception is Kostamis and Duenyas (2011), who show that a supply
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chain comprising an OEM and a supplier might be better off with two dimensions
of asymmetric information rather than just one when the OEM possesses private
information about the demand forecast and/or her production cost.
Even more strikingly, we find that asymmetric information can lead to strictly
higher expected profit even for the supplier when (kh − 1) (kl − 1) > 1 (Proposition
5(c) and Figures 6 and 7). This finding is in contrast to the supply chain literature
that typically shows that asymmetric information results in the less-informed player

























kl = 2, α = 0.5 kl = 2, α = 0.5
Figure 7: Increase in Expected Profits under Asymmetric Information
as compared to Complete Information
In fact, under the pooling equilibrium (i.e., for ζp) and if (kh − 1) (kl − 1) > 1,
both the high-cost OEM and the supplier are strictly better off under asymmetric
information as compared to complete information. The reason for this counterintu-
itive result is as follows: so as not to risk losing the contract, the supplier may offer
low wholesale price (w̃ll) on observing high quality (q̃l). Anticipating this, even the
high-cost OEM may choose high quality. In the pooling equilibrium, despite the high-
cost OEM choosing high quality, the low wholesale price (w̃ll) chosen by the supplier
keeps the sales quantity the same as that under complete information (i.e., the sales
quantity when the high-cost OEM chooses low quality (q̃h) and the supplier responds
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with wholesale price whh).
8 Thus, high quality coupled with the preservation of sales
quantity by the low wholesale price (w̃ll), leads to an increase in total supply-chain
profit (as compared to complete information).9 Moreover, the high-cost OEM earns a
higher profit since both high quality and low wholesale price lead to a higher margin
for her. Finally, the supplier earns a higher profit because he gets a higher margin
when the high-cost OEM chooses high quality (q̃l) and the supplier responds with
low wholesale price (w̃ll), as compared to if the high-cost OEM chose low quality (q̃h)
and the supplier responded with wholesale price whh.
In the complete information scenario, contracting always occurs between the OEM
and the supplier. In contrast, in the asymmetric information scenario, contracting
may not always occur (Proposition 5(e)). Specifically, if the supplier offers high
wholesale price (w̃hl) and the OEM turns out to be a low-cost OEM, contracting does
not occur and the supplier gets only his reservation profit.
2.6. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate implications of the relative cost efficiencies of a supplier
and an OEM’s in-house option on the OEM’s choice of product design quality and
subsequent contract outcomes in a supply chain where the supplier is in a position
to specify contract terms. We model the problem as a dynamic game, wherein the
OEM chooses product design quality (determined by the design quality of a critical
component), followed by the supplier offering a contract for supplying the critical
component. Thereafter, the OEM either accepts the supplier’s offer or chooses her
in-house option, and sells the product in the consumer market.
We contrast two scenarios: complete information and asymmetric information. In
8If the high-cost OEM were to choose high quality (q̃l) under complete information, the supplier
would set high wholesale price (w̃hl) and, consequently, the sales quantity would be lower than if
the supplier set low wholesale price (w̃ll).
9In the pooling equilibrium, since the sales quantity and sourcing decision are the same as under
complete information, the change in total supply-chain profit from asymmetric information (relative
to complete information) depends only on the change in product quality.
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the complete information scenario, we consider two contracts: a price-only contract
and a two-part tariff contract. Contrary to intuition, we show that the supplier’s abil-
ity to offer a two-part tariff contract, compared to the price-only contract, may hurt
not only the OEM (as expected) but also the supplier. Specifically, if the competi-
tiveness of the OEM’s in-house option is sufficiently low, the two-part tariff contract
– compared to the price-only contract – leaves both the OEM and the supplier worse
off.
In the asymmetric information scenario, we examine the impact of OEM’s pri-
vate information about the cost structure of her in-house option on product design
quality and supply chain profits. We show that asymmetric information, under cer-
tain conditions, is beneficial not only for the OEM, but also for the supplier – the
less-informed player. This finding is counterintuitive given that the extant literature
generally shows that asymmetric information results in: (a) the less-informed player
being worse off, and (b) supply chain inefficiency.
The insights obtained from our analysis are, of course, to be considered in the
context of our model setup and assumptions. Relaxing some of these assumptions will
afford deeper insights into the effects of endogenous product quality and the dynamic
nature of contracting games. For instance, it would be interesting to study product
design quality in a supply chain setting where the OEM is in the position to specify
contract terms and the supplier has private information about his cost structure.
Further, the production cost may depend not only on product design quality but
also on investments in process improvement. Finally, the contracts considered could
extend beyond the price-only and two-part tariff contracts analyzed in our work.
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CHAPTER III
THE VALUE OF PRODUCT
RETURNS:INTERTEMPORAL PRODUCT
MANAGEMENT WITH STRATEGIC CONSUMERS
3.1. Introduction
Consumer product returns are an inevitable part of the exchange process between
firms and consumers. Consumers return products for reasons such as defects, per-
formance not meeting expectations, or remorse (Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Guide
et al. 2006). In 2013, the value of consumer returns in the US alone exceeded $267
billion, or 8.6% of gross sales (TRE 2013). In many industries, such as electronics
and computers, consumer returns are substantial and have been growing steadily over
the past few years (Tibben-Lembke 2004). According to a 2011 Consumer Electronics
Association study (CEA 2011), 27% of the consumers returned a newly purchased CE
device. The most common reason for return was functional defects. Interestingly, the
most popular exchange consumers made was for the same model and brand. Firms
often see such returns as a costly component of doing business (Petersen and Kumar
2009, Stock et al. 2006). At the same time, returns provide an opportunity for firms
to extend their product lines in the future by adding refurbished products.
In this paper, we study how a firm balances the trade-offs in devising a strategy to
manage and perhaps even take advantage of product returns. Several factors influence
the trade-offs. First, though refurbished products may cannibalize demand for new
products, they may help the firm capture the low-end segment of the market that
would not purchase a new product (Atasu et al. 2010, Guide and Li 2010, Ovchinnikov
2011). Second, refurbished products usually appear in the market several months
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after new products are introduced (Guide et al. 2006). This gives rise to potential
strategic behavior by consumers, who are increasingly becoming more informed and
sophisticated (Li et al. 2014, Su 2007). Strategic consumers make purchase decisions
based not only on what is offered today, but also on what is expected to be offered
in the future (Besanko and Winston 1990). Firms have an incentive to drop prices
in the future and consumers, in anticipation, reduce their willingness to pay for the
product today (this effect is also referred to as the “time inconsistency problem”).
The result is a reduction in the firm’s total profit (Bulow 1982, Coase 1972).
To the best of our knowledge, the impact of consumers’ strategic behavior has
not received significant attention in prior research on product returns. On the one
hand, product returns may further exacerbate the time inconsistency problem for
the firm because returns provide an option for the firm to extend the product line
in the future by offering the refurbished product in addition to the new product.
On the other hand, product returns may mitigate the time inconsistency problem
since refurbished products act as substitutes for new products in the future. Thus,
it is unclear: (a) how product returns affect a firm’s intertemporal product line and
refurbishing decisions in the presence of strategic consumers, and (b) how product
returns affect a firm’s time inconsistency problem. The following three questions
summarize the focus of our research:
1. How does strategic consumer behavior influence a firm’s product line and refur-
bishing decisions?
2. How do the firm’s product strategy and profit change with the product return
rate and the perceived quality of the refurbished product?
3. How is the firm’s profit influenced by its (in)ability to credibly commit to its
future decisions?
To answer these questions, we develop a two-period game-theoretic model where the
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firm cannot credibly commit to its future decisions, allowing us to capture strategic
consumer behavior in an intertemporal setting. In the first period, the firm offers a
new product to consumers. Consumers, who are utility-maximizing, strategic, and
heterogeneous in their valuations of the product, make their purchase decisions taking
into account not only the net utility from purchasing in the first period but also
anticipated (future) utility from purchasing in the second period. A fraction of the
new units sold in the first period end up as consumer returns due to functional
or cosmetic defects. The firm replaces returned units with functioning new units
(consumers in our model have the incentive to seek replacements for defective units).
In the second period, based on the number of new products sold in the first period
and the number of consumer returns, the firm decides: (1) the quantity of returned
units to refurbish, and (2) the quantity of new products to produce.
Our analysis shows that, for low return rates, the firm offers only the new product
in the second period to avoid cannibalization by the refurbished product. Conversely,
for sufficiently high return rates, the firm offers only the refurbished product in the
second period. More importantly, we find that in the presence of strategic consumers,
the impact of product returns on the firm’s profit is muted, and sometimes even
positive. The reason is that a higher return rate helps the firm implicitly commit to
not offer the new product in the future. This induces more consumers to buy early,
thereby benefiting the firm. A novel contribution of our work is the recognition of
product returns as a possible commitment device. The literature shows that allowing
product returns can help reduce a consumer’s purchase risk (specifically, uncertainty
about product valuation), and therefore a moderate product return rate may be
optimal for the firm (Davis et al. 1998, Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk 2009, Shulman et al.
2011). However, consumers in our model do not face the risk of owning a product
that does not meet their utility expectation. Therefore, our analysis provides an
alternative explanation for the increase in firm profit with an increase in the return
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rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §3.2, we position our research
in the context of the relevant literature. We discuss key assumptions of our model
in §3.3 and derive the firm’s optimal product strategy in §3.4. In §3.5, we contrast
the firm’s optimal product strategy and profit with those in the scenario where the
firm can credibly commit to its future decisions. In §3.6, we discuss extensions of the
model. We conclude with managerial insights in §3.7.
3.2. Literature Review
We consider the product strategy of a firm that caters to strategic consumers and
where product returns from an earlier period can be refurbished for sale in a later
period. Thus, our work is related to two streams of research: (1) closed-loop supply
chains (CLSCs), where the management of product returns has received significant
attention; and (2) the durable goods literature, which examines the challenges of
selling durable products over multiple periods.
The refurbishing of product returns presents an important and growing challenge
for firm operations. The internal competition between new and refurbished products
is an essential concern discussed in the CLSC literature (Guide and Li 2010, Vorasayan
and Ryan 2006). The complexity in managing product returns lies in the fact that the
new and the refurbished products are both substitutes and complements of each other
(Atasu et al. 2008). The complementarity between new and refurbished products
arises in the sense that the number of cores available for refurbishing is limited by the
number of new products sold in earlier periods (Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Ferrer
and Swaminathan 2006). Indeed, if refurbishing is sufficiently attractive, the firm
might have an incentive to deliberately underprice new products to generate more
returns (Debo et al. 2005).
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Papers in the CLSC stream have captured various relationships between produc-
tion and remanufacturing decisions made over multiple periods. For example, in
a multi-period setting, a firm’s strategy (pricing and quantity) for new and refur-
bished products may depend on potential competition from other firms offering new
or refurbished products (Atasu et al. 2008) and on competition for the recovery of
end-of-life products (Majumder and Groenevelt 2001). However, the impact of con-
sumers’ strategic behavior has not received significant attention in this stream. We
believe this is an important issue for two reasons: (i) consumers are increasingly aware
that returns from the sales of new products today may induce the firm to offer refur-
bished products in the future (MacRumors 2012), and (ii) current purchase decisions
of strategic consumers are influenced by their anticipation of the firm’s product strat-
egy in the future (Su 2007). We show that strategic consumer behavior significantly
influences a firm’s strategy for managing product returns and its decision regarding
which products to offer. Specifically, we show that a firm can use returns as an im-
plicit indication that the production of new products will be curbed in the future,
which, in turn, increases a consumer’s willingness to purchase the new product earlier.
The issue of strategic consumer behavior – and its implications on a firm’s in-
tertemporal product strategies – has been of longstanding interest in the durable
goods literature. While a durable goods manufacturer might announce that she will
not continue production in the future, she has the incentive to produce additional
units, reduce prices, and attract new consumers when that future arrives (Coase
1972). This inconsistent behavior of the firm over time is known as “time inconsis-
tency,” with the profit of the firm being negatively affected if consumers are strategic
or forward-looking (Bulow 1982, Stokey 1981). In our model, product returns provide
the firm an opportunity to extend the product line in the future with the refurbished
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product that can be offered in addition to the new product. Arguably, this oppor-
tunity of extending the product line could further exacerbate the time inconsistency
problem for the firm. However, in the future, refurbished products also act as a sub-
stitute for new products, which may help mitigate the time inconsistency problem.
Thus, the impact of product returns on a firm’s time inconsistency problem is unclear
and worth studying.
Several commitment devices have been proposed to counter the time inconsis-
tency problem. These include: leasing as opposed to selling (Bulow 1982, Desai
and Purohit 1998), planned obsolescence (Bulow 1986, Waldman 1993), or choice of
product architecture (Ramachandran and Krishnan 2008). We find that as returns
increase beyond a threshold, the firm would prefer to offer a greater quantity of re-
furbished products in the future; this enables the firm to implicitly commit to limit,
and eventually eliminate, the offering of new products in the future. In summary, we
propose that product returns can be a novel and practical way of addressing the time
inconsistency problem under appropriate circumstances.
3.3. The Model
3.3.1 Model Assumptions and Settings
We consider a two-period model to characterize the dynamics between production
and consumption decisions made at different points of time. In the first period, the
firm offers a new product at price p1 and consumers, who are utility-maximizing
and strategic (or forward looking), decide whether to buy the product in the first
period or wait until the second period. The firm’s returns policy allows consumers to
exchange a defective product for another new unit at no cost; a fraction α′ of all new
products sold are returned due to functional or cosmetic defects (because consumers
are utility-maximizing, they have the incentive to seek replacements for defective
units; we relax this assumption in §3.6 to allow for some consumers to seek refunds
41
instead of replacements). Effectively, the firm receives a fraction α = α′/ (1− α′) of
net sales of the new product as returns. For analytical exposition, we refer to α as
the return rate; however, note that α is convex in α′ (for example, when α′ = 20%,
α = 25%).
The firm can refurbish these returned units and sell them in the second period.
However, the firm may choose to refurbish only a fraction of the returns. The prices of
the new and the refurbished products in the second period are p2 and pr, respectively.
Let q1, q2, and qr be the net sales (we henceforth use “sales” to imply “net sales”,
i.e., quantity produced, less returns) of the new product in the first period, the new
product in the second period, and the refurbished product in the second period,
respectively. The sequence of decisions in our model is shown in Figure 8. We
assume that, at the beginning of the first period, the firm cannot credibly commit to
its future decisions. As we later show in §3.5, if the firm were able to do so, it will
optimally commit to not offer the new product in the second period.
Figure 8: Timeline of Decisions
We assume that the return rate for the new product remains the same in both
the periods. Further, we assume that refurbished products do not have defects, and
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are therefore not returned. This is consistent with the fact that refurbished products
are typically individually tested while new products are typically tested by random
sampling (Atasu et al. 2008). Due to technological obsolescence, product returns in
the second period are salvaged by the firm at a marginal profit of zero (without loss
of generality). In §3.6, we show that relaxing these assumptions does not significantly
change our main qualitative insights.
Products and Costs: We assume that the firm does not incur any fixed costs
but incurs constant marginal costs for producing the new product and refurbishing
a returned product. We denote the marginal costs of production for the new and
the refurbished products by cn and cr respectively. The marginal production cost for
the new product is the same in both the periods. The marginal cost of refurbishing
a returned product is lower than the marginal cost of manufacturing a new product
(i.e. 0 ≤ cr < cn).
The product is perfectly durable, that is, the product delivers the same level of
service in each period, regardless of its age. We define product quality v as a one-
dimensional measure of the value the product delivers over its lifetime. Empirical
research on refurbished products shows that consumers value a refurbished product
less than its new counterpart (Guide and Li 2010, Subramanian and Subramanyam
2012). Consumers perceive the qualities of the new and the refurbished products to
be vn and vr, respectively, where vn > vr. We assume vn > cn and vr > cr, which
allows us to focus on non-trivial situations where the firm is active in at least one of
the two periods.
Consumers: Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations of product quality. We
denote this characteristic of consumers by θ, where a consumer of type θ is willing
to pay vθ for a product of quality v. Thus, a consumer of type θ obtains net utility
vθ − p from a product of quality v offered at price p. For simplicity, we assume that
θ is uniformly distributed between zero and one. We normalize the total market size
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over the two-period planning horizon to one. Each consumer demands at most one
unit of the product (new or refurbished), and consumers do not own any product at
the beginning of the first period. Both the firm and consumers discount future costs,
revenues, and utilities at the rate of ρ per period, where 0 < ρ < 1. Because of the
durability of the product, a consumer who buys a new product in the first period
exits the market.
3.3.2 Dynamics of the Game
Sequence of Decisions: The sequence of decisions is shown in Figure 8. First, the
firm sets the price of the new product (p1) at the beginning of the first period. After
observing the first-period price of the new product, consumers anticipate the (future)
prices of the new and the refurbished products in the second period to be pf2 and
pfr , respectively. Based on these anticipated prices (and availability) of the new and
the refurbished products, consumers decide whether to buy the new product in the
first period or wait until the second period. Subsequently, in the second period, the
firm decides which products to offer (new, refurbished, or both), and at what prices.
Consumers who did not purchase the new product in the first period consider the
product(s) offered in the second period in making their purchase decisions.
The four options for the consumers are: (1) buy a new product in the first period,
(2) wait and buy a new product in the second period, (r) wait and buy a refurbished
product in the second period, and (0) buy none of the products. In the first period,
strategic consumers — in addition to having the foresight to consider future purchas-
ing options — also correctly anticipate the optimal pricing reactions of the firm in the
second period, based on consumers’ purchase decisions in the first period. To obtain
first-period consumption decisions and second-period product offerings (and prices)
that are consistent with each other, we focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibrium




identical to the optimal prices p∗2 and p
∗
r chosen by the firm. Given prices p1, p2,
and pr, the discounted net utilities of consumer type θ from the different purchasing
options are given by:
uθ1 = vnθ − p1
uθ2 = ρ (vnθ − p2)
uθr = ρ (vrθ − pr) .
(3.3.17)
Demands: Let θij represent a marginal consumer who is indifferent between the
two actions i and j, where i and j each represent one of the four consumer options
introduced earlier (i, j ∈ {1, 2, r, 0}). For any given set of prices p1, p2, and pr, the
marginal consumers — obtained from equating respective utilities in (3.3.17) — are
given in Table 1.
Table 1: Marginal Consumers θij
θij j = 2 j = r j = 0
i = 1 (p1−ρp2)/(vn(1−ρ)) (p1−ρpr)/(vn−ρvr) p1/vn
i = 2 - (p2−pr)/(vn−vr) p2/vn
i = r - - pr/vr
If the firm offers both the new and the refurbished products in the second period,
the demands for the different products are: q1 = 1 − θ12, q2 = θ12 − θ2r and qr =
θ2r−θr0. If the firm does not offer the new product in the second period, the demands
for the products are: q1 = 1 − θ1r, and qr = θ1r − θr0. If the firm does not offer the
refurbished product in the second period, the demands are q1 = 1 − θ12 and q2 =
θ12−θ20. Finally, if the the firm does not offer either the new or the refurbished product
in the second period, the demand in the first period is given by q1 = 1 − θ10. Note
that the sales quantity of the refurbished product in the second period is constrained
by the number of new products returned in the first period, i.e., qr ≤ αq1.
Profit Maximization: We solve the firm’s problem by backward induction, starting
with the second period and ending with the first period, which yields a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of prices and consumption decisions. In the second period,
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consumers who did not buy in the first period make their purchase decisions after
observing prices p2 and pr for the new and the refurbished products, respectively. Note
that q1 consumers have already exited the market by purchasing the new product in
the first period. Let Π2(p1) denote the second-period profit of the firm for a given
first-period price of the new product p1 (or, equivalently, sales quantity q1). We use
asterisks to denote optimal solutions/values. The firm’s optimization problem in the
second period is given by:
Π∗2 (p1) = max{p2,pr}|p1
[q2 (~p) (p2 − (1 + α)cn) + qr (~p) (pr − cr)]
s.t. q2 (~p) ≥ 0,
αq1 ≥ qr (~p) ≥ 0,
(3.3.18)
where ~p refers to the vector of prices {p2, pr} in the second period, and q2 (~p) and
qr (~p) are the demands for the new and the refurbished products in the second period
as functions of prices, for a given p1 (or, equivalently, q1). Since refurbished products
are derived from the returns generated by new product sales in the first period, we
impose the constraint αq1 ≥ qr. Note that the effective marginal cost of producing
the new product is (1 + α) cn since the firm has to produce (1 + α) units of the new
product for each unit eventually sold. We denote the optimal second-period prices
for the new and the refurbished products by p∗2 (p1) and p
∗
r (p1), respectively.
In the first period, consumers make their purchase decisions after observing price
p1 and anticipating second-period prices p
f
2 (p1) and p
f
r (p1). In a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, consumers’ anticipated prices and the firm’s optimal prices are
identical, that is, pf2 (p1) = p
∗
2 (p1) and p
f
r (p1) = p
∗
r (p1). The firm’s objective in the
first period is to maximize its total profit over the two-period planning horizon by
setting price p1 for the new product, taking into account optimal second-period prices
p∗2 (p1) and p
∗
r (p1). Let Π denote the total (two-period) discounted profit of the firm
from selling the new product in the first period, and the new product and/or the
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refurbished product in the second period. The firm’s problem at the beginning of the
first period is given by:
Π∗ = max
p1





[q1 (p1) (p1 − (1 + α) cn) + ρΠ∗2 (p1)]
subject to: q1 (p1) ≥ 0, q∗2 (p1) ≥ 0,
αq1 (p1) ≥ q∗r (p1) ≥ 0.
(3.3.19)
where q∗2(p1) and q
∗
r(p1) are the resulting sales quantities from the second-period
prices p∗2(p1) and p
∗
r(p1) that optimize the firm’s second-period profit in Problem
3.3.18 above.
3.4. Analysis
3.4.1 Second Period Optimization
The state of the market at the start of the second period is defined by the number
of new products sold in the first period (q1), which, in turn, determines the number
of units returned in the first period (αq1). In the second period, given q1 and α, the
firm decides whether to produce any more new products and whether to refurbish the
returned units from the first period. The firm chooses one of the following product
strategies in the second period: offer both the new and the refurbished products
(Product Line); offer only the refurbished product (Refurbished Only); offer only the
new product (New Only); offer none of the products (None). We characterize the
optimal second-period product strategies in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Second-Period Product Strategy.
There exist ᾱ, q
1
(α) and q1(α) (with q1 < q̄1), such that in the second period it is
optimal to offer:
i) both the new and the refurbished products if α > ᾱ and q1 < q1(Product Line);
ii) only the refurbished product if α > ᾱ and q
1
≤ q1 < q̄1 (Refurbished Only);
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iii) only the new product if α ≤ ᾱ and q1 < q̄1(New Only); and,
iv) none of the products if q1 ≥ q̄1(None).
Proof. All Proofs are in the Appendix. 
Proposition 6 demarcates the conditions under which the firm should pursue a
specific strategy in the second period. If the firm has saturated the market by selling
a substantial number of new products in the first period (q1 ≥ q̄1), then the remaining
consumers’ willingness to pay in the second period is so low that it is not cost-effective
for the firm to sell any more products. As a result, even if the firm has a substantial
number of units returned in the first period, it is optimal to not offer any product
in the second period (i.e., Proposition 6(iv)). Thus, the firm offers a product in
the second period only if q1 < q̄1. Moreover, the decision to offer the refurbished
product in the second period depends on the relative efficiencies of producing the
new and the refurbished products. When α ≤ ᾱ, the cost per unit perceived quality
of the new product (cn (1 + α) /vn) is lower than that of the refurbished product
(cr/vr). Therefore, if α ≤ ᾱ and q1 < q̄1, the firm offers only the new product (i.e.,
Proposition 6(iii)).
If α > ᾱ, then in the second period, offering the refurbished product becomes
attractive for the firm. However, the sales quantity in the first period determines
whether the firm should continue to offer the new product as well. If q1 ≥ q1, the
willingness to pay of the remaining consumers is relatively low and the firm offers
only the refurbished product in the second period (i.e., Proposition 6(ii)). However,
if q1 < q1, despite the superior cost-efficiency of the refurbished product as compared
to the new product, the firm offers the new product as well because not only is the
market not as saturated from sales in the first period, but also the willingness to pay
of the remaining consumers is relatively high. Therefore, the firm offers both the new
and the refurbished products (i.e., Proposition 6(i)). These product strategies are
illustrated in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Second Period: Strategy Space for given q1 and α
(cn = 0.5, cr = 0.35, vn = 1.0, vr = 0.65)
3.4.2 Complete Two-Period Solution
In the previous section, we characterized the firm’s second-period product strategies
given the first-period sales quantity (q1). In this section, we analyze the complete two-
period game between the firm and the consumer. Consumers make their purchase
decisions in the first period, taking into account not only the price of the new product
in the first period, but also the anticipated product offering and prices in the second
period. Such strategic behavior by consumers influences the firm’s product strategy
and pricing decisions over both periods. Proposition 7 presents the firm’s optimal
product strategy over both periods.
Proposition 7. Complete Two-Period Product Strategy.
The firm always offers the new product in the first period.
Further, there exist vNr (α), v
R
r (α) such that the firm’s optimal strategy in the second
period is to offer:
i) only the new product if vr ≤ vNr (New Only);
ii) both the new and the refurbished products if vNr < vr < v
R
r (Product Line); and,
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iii) only the refurbished product if vr ≥ vRr (Refurbished Only).
We discuss the optimal product strategy derived in Proposition 7 in conjunction
with Figure 10, which numerically illustrates the relationship between the thresholds
vNr and v
R
r and the return rate α. Since the new product is always offered in the first
period, Figure 10 focuses on the product strategy in the second period.
Figure 10: Optimal Second Period Product Strategy
(cn = 0.5, cr = 0.35, vn = 1.0, ρ = 0.5)





the new product in the second period is more profitable than refurbishing product
returns. Additionally, when the return rate α is low, the limited supply of returns
from the first period further limits the opportunity to offer the refurbished product in
the second period. Moreover, when α is low, the effective marginal cost of producing
the new product cn (1 + α) is also low. Therefore, when the perceived quality of
the refurbished product and the return rate are low, the firm offers only the new
product in both periods. In contrast, when both vr and α are sufficiently high,
consumers perceive the refurbished product to be closer in quality to the new product(
vr ≥ vRr
)
and the effective cost of producing new products cn (1 + α) is high. Under
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these conditions, refurbishing is more profitable than producing the new product, and
there is an ample supply of returns for refurbishing. Therefore, the firm offers only
the refurbished product in this region.
In the intermediate range, vNr < vr < v
R
r , offering a product line in the second
period is optimal. In this range, refurbished products are perceived to be of sufficiently
high quality that it is worthwhile for the firm to produce them; at the same time, the
new product can be sold without severe cannibalization by the refurbished product.
As a result, offering the vertically differentiated product line (i.e., both the new and
the refurbished products) is optimal. It is also worth noting from Figure 10 that
offering the product line is optimal when vr is large but α is low; this is so because
although refurbished products are highly profitable to offer in this situation, low
returns constrain their production. Therefore, the new product is included as part of
the product line in the second period to capitalize on the market opportunity.
We also study the firm’s optimal usage of returns for refurbishing. While Proposi-
tion 7 shows that the firm refurbishes returns only if vr > v
N
r , an important question
pertaining to the firm’s operations strategy is: how many of the returns should be
refurbished? Figure 11 answers this question. Naturally, the firm should offer the re-
furbished product if its perceived quality is sufficiently large (vr > v
N
r in Proposition
7(ii)), refurbishing some of the returns as vr exceeds this threshold, and refurbishing
all of the returns if vr is sufficiently higher.
It is reasonable to expect that it would be optimal to refurbish only a fraction
of the returns if the return rate α is large. Intriguingly, we find that as α exceeds a
certain threshold, the firm should refurbish all of the returns. The reason is that a
high return rate adds to the effective cost cn (1 + α) of producing the new product;
the firm therefore limits the quantity of the new product in the first period, thus
curtailing the supply of returns for refurbishing. Furthermore, a high α also increases
the cost of offering new products in the second period, making it more attractive to
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Figure 11: Optimal Returns Management
(cn = 0.5, cr = 0.35, vn = 1.0, ρ = 0.5)
offer as many refurbished units as possible in the second period before the new product
is considered. Thus, the firm optimally refurbishes more of the returns even as the
the return rate increases. In summary, the attractiveness of offering the refurbished
product increases with the return rate, as is evident from the firm’s optimal product
strategy. For sufficiently high return rates coupled with a sufficiently high perceived
value of the refurbished product, the firm not only offers the refurbished product
alone in the second period to avoid cannibalization from the new product, but also
refurbishes all of the returns.
Overall, the firm’s optimal strategy is to always offer the new product in the first
period and at least one version of the product — new or refurbished — in the second
period. As the product does not improve over time, delaying its launch to the second
period is naturally suboptimal. Furthermore, unless the firm sets a suboptimally low
price for the new product in the first period, it is impossible for the firm to induce the
entire segment of prospective consumers to buy in the first period itself. Therefore,
the firm offers at least one product (new or refurbished, or both) in the second period.
While this helps simplify the strategy space for the firm, it also implies that the firm
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must deal with the time inconsistency problem, which we discuss in §3.5.
3.5. Return Rate and the Time Inconsistency Problem
In this section, we analyze the impact of product return rate α on the firm’s total
profit. Since firms not only incur the cost of refurbishing product returns but also have
to charge lower prices for refurbished products as compared to new products, returns
are deemed undesirable and firms strive to reduce them (CEA 2011). However, we
show that in the presence of strategic consumers, the opportunity to offer a refurbished
product as a substitute for the new product may offset the negative effects of product
returns. In fact, under certain conditions, an increase in product returns might even
lead to an increase in firm profit.
The primary impact of product returns is an effective increase in the unit produc-
tion cost, cn (1 + α). The secondary effect, as we show in the following analysis, is
that product returns in the first period decrease — and eventually eliminate — the
firm’s incentive to produce the new product in the second period. This enables the
firm to implicitly commit to not producing the new product in the second period.
In §3.5.1, we derive the firm’s optimal strategy in the scenario where it can credibly
commit to its future decisions, and contrast it to the firm’s strategy derived in §3.4,
where it cannot make such a commitment. Subsequently, in §3.5.2, we analyze the
impact of the return rate on overall firm profit under both these scenarios. Our anal-
ysis shows that returns have the potential to solve the well-known time inconsistency
problem for durable products.
3.5.1 Commitment and Product Strategy
Base-Case: When the Firm can Credibly Commit. We first consider the
scenario in which the firm can credibly commit to its future production and pricing
decisions at the beginning of the first period (we refer to this as the “commitment
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scenario”). The commitment scenario helps us identify drivers of firm’s profit in no-
commitment scenario. We use the superscript C to denote optimal solutions/values
for the commitment scenario. The firm’s optimization problem is given by:
ΠC = max
p1,p2,pr
[q1 (~p) (p1 − (1 + α) cn) + ρq2 (~p) (p2 − (1 + α) cn) + ρqr (~p) (pr − cr)]
s.t. q1 (~p) ≥ 0, q2 (~p) ≥ 0,
αq1 (~p) ≥ qr (~p) ≥ 0
(3.5.20)
where ~p is the vector of prices {p1, p2, pr} for the products in the first and second pe-
riods, and q1 (~p), q2 (~p), and qr (~p) are the corresponding demands for these products.
Proposition 8. Complete Two-Period Product Strategy: Commitment Sce-
nario.
If the firm can credibly commit to its future decisions at the beginning of the first
period, it will not produce the new product in the second period, i.e., qC2 = 0.
Further, there exist ᾱ, v̄r(α), such that the firm’s optimal strategy in the second period
is to:
i) not refurbish, i.e., qCr = 0, if α ≤ ᾱ;
ii) refurbish some of the returns, i.e., αqC1 > q
C
r > 0, if α > ᾱ and vr < v̄r; and,
iii) refurbish all of the returns, i.e., αqC1 = q
C
r > 0, if α > ᾱ and vr ≥ v̄r.
If the firm is able to commit to its future product strategy at the beginning of the
first period, the firm optimally commits to not offer the new product in the second
period. As prior work has shown, such a commitment allows the firm to steer sales
of new products to the first period and, therefore, maximize profit (Bulow 1982).
Further, when the return rate is sufficiently low (i.e., α ≤ ᾱ in Proposition 8(i)), the
firm also commits to not offer the refurbished product in the second period. Although
this results in wastage of returns, it induces more consumers to purchase the new
product in the first period rather than wait for the (cheaper) refurbished product in
54
the second period. At the other extreme, if the return rate is significantly high and
if the perceived quality of the refurbished product is sufficiently high (Proposition
8(iii)), it is optimal for the firm to refurbish all of the returns. These second-period
strategies are depicted in Figure 12 below.
















Figure 12: Optimal Second Period Product Strategy: Commitment Scenario
(cn = 0.3, cr = 0.2, vn = 1.0, ρ = 0.5)
Effect of Commitment on Product Strategy: Comparing the results in Propo-
sitions 7 and 8 yields an important insight regarding the impact of commitment on
the firm’s product strategy, especially in the second period. If the firm has the ability
to credibly commit to its future actions, it will optimally commit to not offer the new
product in the second period
(
i.e., qC2 = 0
)
. However, if the firm cannot make such
a commitment, the firm will indeed (optimally) offer the new product in the second
period when vr < v
R
r (as shown in Proposition 7(ii) and illustrated in Figure 10 in
§3.4.2). Furthermore, when α < ᾱ, the firm would like to make a stronger commit-
ment that no product — neither new nor refurbished — will be offered in the second
period. However, in the absence of the ability to credibly make such a commitment,
the firm always offers some combination of products (new, refurbished, or both) in
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the second period.
What makes such a commitment desirable for the firm? Consumers with relatively
high valuations of product quality buy the new product in the first period. Therefore,
if the firm wants to sell the new product in the second period too, it has to lower
the price to induce the remaining consumers — who have lower valuations of product
quality — to buy the product. If the firm cannot credibly commit to its future
decisions, strategic consumers take this intertemporal price difference into account
and, thus, are less willing to purchase the product in the first period. However, if the
firm can credibly commit to not offer the new product in the second period, it can
earn a higher profit by inducing more consumers purchase the new product in the
first period. It is worth noting that the commitment scenario in Bulow (1982) turns
out to be a special case of the commitment scenario in our paper.
3.5.2 Returns as a Commitment Device
Managers typically perceive returns as a costly component of doing business (CEA
2011). However, we show in this section that product returns can enable a firm to
implicitly commit to its future decisions, even if the firm cannot explicitly make such
a commitment. We begin by comparing the firm’s profits when it can credibly commit
and when it cannot.
Proposition 9. Returns as a Commitment Device.
i) The firm’s optimal profit Π∗ in the no-commitment scenario is never greater than
the firm’s optimal profit ΠC in the commitment scenario.
ii) However, there exists αc such that the profits in the two scenarios are identical for
α ≥ αc.
Proposition 9 shows that the time inconsistency problem exists for sufficiently low
return rates, but the problem is completely eliminated for sufficiently high return
rates. If the firm were able to credibly commit to its second-period strategy in the
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first period, the firm would optimally not produce the new product in the second
period. In contrast, if the firm is unable to credibly commit to its future decisions, it
may be compelled to offer the new product in the second period as well, resulting in
a lower profit. However, when the return rate is sufficiently high (α ≥ αc), the firm’s
profits in the commitment and no-commitment scenarios become identical. This is
so because when the supply of returns from first-period sales is abundant, the firm
optimally offers only the refurbished product in the second period even if it cannot
make a credible commitment that it will not offer the new product in the second
period (Proposition 6(ii)). Therefore, a high return rate allows the firm to implicitly
commit to not offer the new product in the second period. Thus, a sufficiently high
return rate eliminates the time inconsistency problem. This is illustrated in Figure
13, wherein the profits in the commitment and no-commitment scenarios are identical
for α & 0.21.













Figure 13: Optimal Profits in the Commitment and No-Commitment Scenarios
(cn = 0.7, cr = 0.1, vn = 1.0, vr = 0.85, ρ = 0.9)
Additionally, product returns can have a counterintuitive effect on the firm’s over-
all profit: in a certain range of return rates, the firm’s overall (two-period) profit can
increase with the return rate α (for 0.13 . α . 0.18 in Figure 13). In contrast, when
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the firm can credibly commit to its future decisions, its profit always monotonically
decreases in α. This finding is of theoretical as well as practical importance. We ex-
plore this phenomenon further, and outline the conditions under which firm’s profit
increases with α in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10. Return Rates and Profits in the Commitment and No-
Commitment Scenarios.
i) Commitment Scenario. When the firm can credibly commit to its future deci-
sions, its profit monotonically decreases in the return rate α.
ii) No-Commitment Scenario. When the firm cannot credibly commit to its future
decisions, there exists v̂r(α) such that the firm’s profit can be non-monotonic in α for
vr > v̂r.
Practitioners logically view returns in a negative light because returns directly
result in increased costs — the effective cost of producing the new product, the cost
of refurbishing returns, and the loss of revenue due to the lower perceived value of the
refurbished product. However, this negative view of returns is unequivocally valid
only in the scenario where the firm can make a credible commitment about its future
actions (Proposition 10(i)). When the firm cannot make such a commitment, the
role of returns in mitigating the time inconsistency problem has an indirect (posi-
tive) impact on the firm’s profit. A higher return rate could increase firm profit by
mitigating — and even eliminating — the time inconsistency problem faced by the
firm; a sufficiently high return rate allows the firm to implicitly commit that the new
product will be offered exclusively in the first period, and therefore be able to charge
a premium for it. Further, under the conditions identified in Proposition 10(ii) and
illustrated in Figure 13, as the return rate increases, the positive effect of returns in
mitigating the time inconsistency problem may increasingly dominate the negative
impact of returns on the production cost; this results in an increase in firm profit
within a certain range [αl, αh] of the return rate.
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Perceived Quality of the Refurbished Product and the Value of Returns
Product returns can be an effective solution to the time inconsistency problem because
the firm can use returns to implicitly commit that new products will effectively be
crowded out of production in the second period. However, the value of product
returns depends on the cost of refurbishing and the perceived value of the refurbished
product. To understand the impacts of these two factors, we numerically consider
the range of return rates [αl, αh] over which firm profit increases with the return rate
α (see Figure 14).
First, the range of return rates over which the firm’s profit increases (with respect
to α) is wider for larger values of vr, the perceived value of the refurbished product.
The implication is that if a firm can improve consumers’ perception of the refurbished
product (e.g., through marketing efforts), not only does refurbishing become more at-
tractive, but also a higher rate of consumer returns may become more desirable. It
is also worth noting that when vr is high, the [αl, αh] range can be quite significant
(between 9% and 18% in Figure 14). In such a situation, the firm would, counter-
intuitively, rather have a return rate of 18% than a much lower return rate of 9%.
Second, the [αl, αh] range also widens with a decrease in the cost of refurbishing cr.
Our work complements prior research on product returns in the sense that we
provide an alternative explanation for why a moderate amount of returns may be
preferable to lower returns. The extant literature shows that though generous return
policies increase returns, they also reduce a consumer’s purchase risk (specifically,
uncertainty about product valuation), thereby implying that a moderate amount
of returns is optimal (Davis et al. 1998, Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk 2009). In this
paper, we assume that the quality of the product is common knowledge and consumer
valuations are deterministic, although a particular new unit may be defective and
therefore exchanged for a functioning new unit. In other words, consumers in our
model do not face the risk of owning a product that does not meet their utility
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Figure 14: Range in which Profits Increase with Return Rates
(cn = 0.7, vn = 1.0, ρ = 0.9)
expectations. Thus, our analysis provides an alternative explanation for the possible
increase in a firm’s profit with the return rate.
3.6. Robustness
We examine the robustness of the results to our assumptions regarding product return
rates, the salvage value of returns, and consumers always exchanging a defective new
unit for another new unit.
First, we relax the assumption that the return rate of the new product is the same
in both the periods. It is plausible that the firm can improve (reduce) product return
rates over time either from learning-by-doing as the firm becomes more experienced
in producing the new product, or from improving quality control processes or using
improved production technology. Therefore, we allow a lower return rate for the new
product in the second period as compared to the first period. Let α2 be the return
rate for the new product in the second period such that α2 = k2α, where 0 < k2 ≤ 1.
A lower k2 implies that producing the new product in the second period becomes more
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attractive.1 We find that our results on the firm’s product strategy (identified in §3.4)
continue to hold and that product returns continue to play a role as a commitment
device. As k2 decreases, the return rate above which the firm’s profit can increase
(see Proposition 10(ii)), becomes larger because the effective cost of producing the
new product in the second period decreases.
Second, we relax the assumption that refurbished products are non-defective. Re-
call that we justified this assumption given the cumulative diagnostics and individual
testing performed on refurbished products (Atasu et al. 2008, Guide et al. 2006). We
allow the return rate αr for the refurbished product in the second period to be a
fraction of the return rate α for the new product. Thus, αr = krα where kr ≥ 0.
Again, we find that our results on the firm’s product strategy and the role of product
returns as a commitment device continue to hold. In particular, we observe that as kr
increases, the return rate above which the firm’s profit can increase, becomes larger.
This is so because a larger kr means that the effective cost of refurbishing is larger,
which impairs the ability of returns to mitigate the time inconsistency problem.
Third, we allow for a positive (exogenous) salvage value 0 ≤ s ≤ cn for product
returns that accompany sales of the new product in the first and second periods.2
For returns resulting from first-period sales, the firm now has the option to refurbish
them (at a margin of pr− cr) or salvage them for a fixed value of s per unit. Further,
second period returns can now be salvaged for a positive value s, whereas they did
not yield any value in our main model. We would expect a positive salvage value
for product returns to unequivocally improve firm profit. However, this is not always
true and profit can decrease with exogenous s. To understand this, recall that the
reason returns serve as a commitment device is that returns make it attractive for
1We assume that k2 is sufficiently high such that the firm does not trivially postpone all produc-
tion to the more efficient second period.
2The salvage value s is bounded above by cn; otherwise, the firm can trivially make infinite profit
by producing infinite units of the new product and salvaging all of them. Further, in this extension
and as in our main model, refurbished products are not defective and, therefore, are not returned.
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the firm to produce the refurbished product instead of the new product in the second
period. However, when s is higher, the firm’s incentive to refurbish is lower; in other
words, the firm has a greater incentive to produce the new product in the second
period. Therefore, as s increases, the firm’s ability to use returns as a commitment
device diminishes. In particular, we observe that as s increases, the return rate above
which the firm’s profit can increase, becomes larger.
Fourth, we relax the three aforementioned assumptions simultaneously. The re-
sulting setting is that the firm produces q1 (1 + α) units of the new product in the
first period, of which q1 units are sold and αq1 units are returned. In the second
period, the firm refurbishes qr (1 + αr) units that were returned in the first period.
qr units of the refurbished product are sold and αrqr units are again returned in the
second period. In the second period, the firm also produces q2 (1 + α2) units of the
new product, of which q2 units are sold and α2q2 units are returned. Thus, the total
quantity of returns not refurbished is (αq1 − qr + α2q2), for which the firm obtains a
salvage value s per unit. Our qualitative results again continue to hold.
Finally, we relax the assumption that each returned new unit is exchanged for
another new unit, by considering two types of returns: returns that result in an
exchange, and returns that result in a refund. Let αe ≤ α be the proportion of
consumers who exchange a defective new unit with another new unit. Thus, α−αe is
the proportion of consumers who return defective new units for a refund. Yet again,
we find that our results on the firm’s product strategy (identified in §3.4) continue
to hold and that product returns continue to play a role as a commitment device.
Further, we observe that when αe < α, firm profit is lower than when αe = α (i.e., our
main analysis). This is so because consumers who receive refunds do not contribute
to firm profit in the first period.
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3.7. Conclusion
Consumer returns — products returned due to functional or cosmetic defects —
are a significant and growing concern in product categories such as computers and
electronics. These returns represent a costly component of doing business, and firms
often refurbish the returns to recover value. While refurbishing might allow the firm
to extend its product line in a cost-efficient way in the future, it could simultaneously
give rise to strategic behavior by consumers. This issue has largely been overlooked
in the deep literature on closed-loop supply chains. Although refurbished products
are perceived to be of lower quality as compared to new products, offering them in
the future can make waiting — for better prices and wider choices — an attractive
option for strategic consumers.
In this paper, we developed a model to capture the effect of strategic behavior by
consumers on the intertemporal product strategy of a firm facing consumer returns.
Specifically, we develop a two-period game-theoretic model that captures the temporal
separation observed in practice between when a new product is launched by a firm
and when its refurbished version is offered. We characterize the firm’s intertemporal
product strategy when it cannot credibly commit to its future actions, and contrast it
with the strategy in the scenario where the firm can credibly commit. If the firm can
credibly commit to a future strategy, it will simply announce that the new product
will not be offered in the future, as a way to encourage consumers to buy the new
product earlier at a higher price. In reality, such commitments are seldom credible
(Coase 1972) and, as a result, the firm ends up with a lower total profit.
Our model-based analysis shows that a high return rate can restore this commit-
ment capability when refurbishing is attractive: when refurbishing is economical to
the firm and when consumers’ perceived value of the refurbished product is high,
the firm responds to a high return rate by simultaneously increasing the number of
refurbished units and choking the production of new units in the second period. This
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provides an implicit, and to our knowledge, a novel way to commit that the new
product will be scarce (or, in the extreme, not available at all) if consumers choose
to wait. A high return rate allows the firm to implicitly commit that the new prod-
uct will be offered exclusively in the first period, and therefore be able to charge a
premium for it. As a result, we find the counterintuitive result that the firm’s profit
may increase with the return rate under certain conditions.
We find that our qualitative findings are robust to model assumptions such as
return rate differences across products (new and refurbished) and periods. Future
research can further extend our work along several dimensions. First, we assume that
the return rates and the perceived values of the products are independent; however,
consumers may update their opinions of product quality based on the return rates.
Second, while we focus on a market full of strategic consumers to deduce the role of
returns as a commitment device, a more general formulation of the problem could al-
low for a mix of strategic and non-strategic consumers. Third, because of our research
focus, we assume the product return rate to be common knowledge between the firm
and consumers. While consumers may be able to infer return rates from product
discussion forums (MacRumors 2012), annual reports (for publicly traded firms; typ-
ically 10-Ks), and from industry studies (such as those cited in this paper), the firm
may have asymmetrically better information on the return rate. Fourth, according to
the 2011 Consumer Electronics Association study (CEA 2011), when returning a CE
device, the most popular exchange consumers make is for the same model and same
brand (38%), followed by a different model but the same brand (13%). 17% return
a product for a different brand and 27% request some form of monetary compen-
sation such as store credit or reimbursement. Although our analysis, including the
extensions, treats the majority (65%) of these instances, the consideration of multiple
products offered by the same firm or competition with another firm’s products will
extend the coverage of the return instances in practice. Finally, the effect of return
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rates on the incentive to create better products and processes remains unexplored
and is a valuable direction to consider in future work.
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CHAPTER IV
THE VALUE OF COMPETITION IN
REMANUFACTURING
4.1. Introduction
According to a Gartner research report (Gartner 2015), consumers in mature markets
upgrade their smartphones every 18 to 20 months. Consequently, as the report fore-
casts, the worldwide market for refurbished phones that are sold to end users is set
to grow to 120 million units by 2017, with an equivalent wholesale revenue of around
$14 billion. This is up from 56 million units in 2014, with an equivalent wholesale
revenue of $7 billion. While only seven percent of smartphones end up in official
recycling programs, 64 percent get a second lease of life with 41 percent being traded
in or sold privately.
The report also reckons that the growing number of privately sold phones will
stir up competition in the take-back market and drive refurbishers to engage in more
aggressive marketing campaigns and new incentives. Therefore, original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) often try to deter the entry of independent third-party reman-
ufacturers by various means. Such efforts begin at the design phase of new products.
OEMs design their products such that acquisition and remanufacturing of used prod-
ucts by third-party remanufacturers becomes expensive and difficult. For example,
the MacBook Pro with Retina Display 13” consists of proprietary pentalobe screws
(making opening the device unnecessarily difficult), the battery assembly is entirely,
and very solidly, glued into the case (complicating replacement), the screws and ca-
ble holding the trackpad are buried under battery (making it impossible to replace
the trackpad without first removing the battery), the Retina display is a fused unit
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(requiring the entire assembly to be replaced) with no protective glass (making it
susceptible to break), the proprietary SSD isn’t a standard drive, and the RAM is
soldered to the motherboard (making it much harder to extract and replace) (iFixit
2013). Similarly, OEMs selling smartphones and tablets too solder/glue components
such as battery and memory card to logic board, fuse the display with the front
glass, and use proprietary screws, making disaasembly and repair difficult. Moreover,
OEMs such as Apple do not share repair manuals with consumers and third-party
remanufacturers. Finally, OEMs try to be proactive in acquiring the used products
from consumers.
Moreover, consumers are increasingly becoming more informed and sophisticated
(Li et al. 2014, Su 2007). When consumers buy products, they consider not only the
products (among new, used and remanufactured products) and their selling prices
but also future resale value of these products (Reardon 2015).
In this paper we show that an OEM who remanufactures used products can be
better off with competition in remanufacturing from an independent third-party re-
manufacturer. The reason is that competition in acquisition of the used products
for remanufacturing increases the resale value of the new products. As a result, the
OEM can charge a higher price for the new products, thereby earning a higher overall
profit.
4.2. Literature Review
Our paper spans two streams of research: (a) secondhand (used-product) markets,
and (b) remanufacturing of used products.
The durable goods literature studies the behavior of a firm selling products that de-
preciate over time. A firm selling new products has an incentive to induce consumers
to replace their used products with the new products. In the presence of a well-
functioning secondhand market, consumers holding used products can sell their used
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products to other consumers. Products are traded from high-valuation consumers
to low-valuation consumers in a competitive secondary market, allowing consumers
to update to their preferred quality. This stream of literature mainly investigates
whether and when a firm benefits from the secondhand market, and whether and
when a firm has incentives to eliminate the secondhand market, that is, to behave in
a fashion such that there are no old products available to serve as potential substitutes
for the new products. The effect of a secondhand market on the demand for the new
products can be decomposed into two components: a positive resale value effect due
to the option value of selling new units as they become old; and a negative substitu-
tion effect due to the (imperfect) substitutability of new and used products (Hendel
and Lizzeri 1999, Waldman 1996a, Waldman 1996b, Waldman 1997). The litera-
ture is equivocal in answering whether a firm benefits from the secondhand market.
While Levinthal and Purohit (1989) and Waldman (1996a) show that the presence
of a secondhand market can cause a reduction in the profitability of a monopolist
firm, Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) show, to the contrary, that a firm benefits from a
smoothly functioning secondhand market. The literature also identifies various ways
firms try to eliminate the secondhand markets such as leasing (Bulow 1982, Wald-
man 1997), planned obsolescence (Bulow 1986, Levinthal and Purohit 1989, Waldman
1993, Waldman 1996a, Waldman 1996b) , restricting a consumer’s ability to main-
tain the good (Hendel and Lizzeri 1999) and trade-ins (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998).
However, this stream of research ignores the remanufacturing of used products and
the effect of competition in remanufacturing on resale value of products and resulting
impact on firm profit.
Existing research in the remanufacturing literature has largely investigated whether
and when the OEMs should remanufacture the used products (also called “cores”),
and whether and when the OEMs allow third-party players to remanufacturer the
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used products (Atasu et al. 2008, Debo et al. 2005, Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Ma-
jumder and Groenevelt 2001). To make sound decisions, the OEMs must take into
account the follwoing: first, the presence of remanufactured products may cannibal-
ize the demand of an OEM’s new products since remanufactured products may act
as low-end substitutes for the new product. Second, if the OEM chooses not to re-
manufacture, third-party players may collect and remanufacture the used products,
creating a competition for the OEM’s new products.
Literature in remanufacturing models price of used products either zero (Atasu
et al. 2008, Ferguson and Toktay 2006, Majumder and Groenevelt 2001), or as a func-
tion of quantity of used products available (Debo et al. 2005) or both quantity and
quality of used products (Oraiopoulos et al. 2012). Majumder and Groenevelt (2001)
consider core allocation mechanism between the OEM and local remanufacturers as
exogenously given and do not consider the competition for used items. However, the
literature in remanufacturing implicitly assumes that the competition in remanufac-
turing does not influence the resale (residual) value of the new product. In our model,
the price of used products depends not only on quantity and quality of used products
but also on competitive environment in remanufacturing.
The literature in remanufacturing concludes that the entry of a third-party re-
manufacturer is detrimental for the OEM and that it is profitable for the OEM to
remanufacture or collect cores to preempt third parties (Atasu et al. 2008, Debo
et al. 2005, Ferguson and Toktay 2006). Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) show that
OEM’s profits are higher in monopoly than in competition from a local remanufac-
turer. Therefore, OEM has the incentive to restrict competition from local remanu-
facturer by making cost of remanufacturing high and is willing to forego some of the
benefits of remanufacturing in order to restrict the local remanufacturer. Ferrer and
Swaminathan (2006) show that a low cost of remanufacturing causes higher partici-
pation by the OEM in the secondary market. Ferguson and Toktay (2006) find that
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as the third party remanufacturer becomes more competitive and the cannibalization
threat increases, the OEM increases her efforts to deter the entry of independent
remanufacturers through collection of cores even if remanufacturing is not profitable
for the OEM. Debo et al. (2005) show that when independent firms remanufacture
the cores, the OEM incorporates lower remanufacturability (defined by the number
of cores available for remanufacturing) to reduce the number of cores independent
remanufacturers can collect, effectively deterring the competition. They show that
keeping all else equal, a manufacturer is better off without competition in the mar-
ket for remanufactured products. Atasu et al. (2008) show that under competition
(either from another firm offering the new product or from a local remanufacturer)
remanufacturing can become an effective marketing strategy, allowing the OEM to
defend its market share via price discrimination. They show that remanufacturing
is more beneficial under competition than in a monopoly setting; the tougher the
competition, the more profitable is remanufacturing. This is so because remanufac-
tured products help the OEM compete for the low-valuation consumer, who would
otherwise be lost to competitors.
Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) consider resale value as an endogenous decision (de-
pendent on quantity and quality of used products and competition from the OEM’s
new products), they also show that as the number of third-party remanufacturers
increases, the OEM profit increases. However, they show this result in a situation
where the OEM does not participate in remanufacturing and charges a relicensing fee
– an additional lever through which the OEM extracts profits from remanufacturing
– to the third-party remanufacturer.
In contrast, we show that an OEM, who also remanufactures used products, can be
better off with encouraging competition in remanufacturing from third-party (inde-
pendent) remanufacturers. Competition can affect the OEM’s profit in two ways: the
profit from remanufacturing decreases; the profit from the new product may increase
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due to an increase in resale value of the new products.
4.3. Model
Consider a discrete time, two-period world inhabited by an OEM, a third-party re-
manufacturer (3PR) and consumers.
Consumers: Market consists of two consumer segments. We henceforth refer to
these segments by “high segment” and “low segment” respectively. These segments
differ in their preferences for product quality. We denote this characteristics of the
high and low segments by θh and θl, respectively, where θh > θl. In particular, the
high and low segments get per period utility θhq and θlq, respectively, from a product
of quality q. Moreover, we denote the size of the high and low segments by nh and nl,
respectively, and assume that the size of each segment remains constant over time.
In each period, a consumer uses either zero or one unit of the products (out of new,
used and remanufactured products). Consumers are strategic in the sense that they
make purchase decisions in order to maximize their intertemporal net utility.
In the first period, the OEM offers a new product of quality q at price p1 and
consumers, taking into account second period options, decide whether to buy the
new product. The new product can be used for two periods. However, the product
depreciates over time and the units of the new product sold in the first period become
“used products” in the second period. We denote the quality of the used product by
δq, where δ can be interpreted as durability of the new product. If a consumer of type
θ keeps the used product, he derives utility θδq from using it in the second period.
However, in the second period, a consumer holding a used product can buy a
new product and sell his used product to either the OEM or the 3PR, who, in turn,
can remanufacture the acquired used products and sell the remanufactured products
to consumers. For exposition, we assume that consumers cannot trade the used
products among themselves and that the OEM and the 3PR need to remanufacture
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the used products in order to resell them to consumers. We model the second period
interactions among the OEM, the 3PR and consumers by a two stage game.
In the first stage, the OEM offers the new product at price p2 to consumers
including those who hold the used products, and consumers, taking into account
expected prices of the used and the remanufactured products, decide whether to buy
the new product. The cost and quality of the new product remains the same in both
the periods. We denote the marginal cost of producing the new product by cn.
In the second stage, the OEM and the 3PR acquire the used products from con-
sumers and offer remanufactured products of quality δrq and δ̃rq, respectively. In
line with empirical findings, we assume that (a) the remanufactured products are of
lower quality than the new product but of higher quality than the used product, and
(b) the remanufactured products offered by the 3PR are not of higher quality than
those offered by the OEM. In particular, we assume 1 > δr ≥ δ̃r > δ ≥ 0. The cost of
remanufacturing a used product for the OEM and the 3PR are cr and c̃r, respectively.
The OEM and the 3PR compete to acquire the used products by setting prices pu
and p̃u, respectively. A consumer sells his used product to the player (between the
OEM or the 3PR) who pays a higher price. We assume that if both the OEM and the
3PR set the same price, the consumer sells the product to the OEM. This assump-
tion is reasonable because OEMs, in practice, have greater access to used products
due to their established relationships with consumers. Let the quantities of the used
products acquired by the OEM and the 3PR be Qu and Q̃u, respectively. The OEM
and the 3PR offer the remanufactured products at prices pr and p̃r, respectively. Let
the quantities of remanufactured products offered by the OEM and the 3PR be Qr
and Q̃r, respectively.
The OEM and the 3PR discount their profits and consumers their net utilities by
a common discount factor ρ. We denote total profits of the OEM by Πt, and the first
and second period profits of the OEM by Π1 and Π2, respectively. Finally, we denote
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profits of the OEM and the 3PR from acquisition and remanufacturing of the used
products by Πr and Π̃r, respectively.
To focus on the remanufacturing of the used products, we consider parameter
settings in which the OEM has an incentive to offer the new product to the consumers
holding the used products, and the OEM and the 3PR have incentives to acquire
and remanufacture the used products. In particular, we restrict our attention to
parameter settings in which it is optimal for the OEM to offer the new product to
the high segment in each period but not optimal to offer the new product to the low
segment in either of the periods. Moreover, we assume θh (1− δ) q + θlδrq > cn + cr
to ensure that, in the second period, the OEM has an incentive to offer the new
product to the high segment and the remanufactured product to the low segment.
Finally, we also assume θlδrq > cr and θlδ̃rq > c̃r to ensure that the OEM and the
3PR have incentives to acquire and remanufacture the used products, and sell the
remanufactured products to the low segment in the second period.
4.4. Analysis
We first solve for acquisition and remanufacturing of the used products in the absence
of competition from the 3PR (monopoly) and presence of competition from the 3PR
(competition). Subsequently, we analyze the offering of the new products by the
OEM in each period.
4.4.1 Second Period: Acquisition and Remanufacturing
4.4.1.1 Monopoly
In the second stage, the OEM (in the absence of competition from the 3PR) sets
price and quantity of the used products to be acquired, and price and quantity of the
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Qr (pr − cr)−Qupu
s.t. Qr ≤ Qu ≤ nh,
(4.4.21)
where the constraint implies that the OEM cannot remanufacture more than the
number of used products acquired by her and that the OEM cannot acquire more
than the number of used products available in the market. Proposition 11 outlines
the optimal solution of the OEM’s problem (4.4.21). We denote the optimal solution
by superscript m.
Proposition 11. In the monopoly, the following is the optimal solution:
(a) acquisition price of used products pmu = 0;
(b) acquired quantity of used products Qmu = min {nh, nl};
(c) price of remanufactured products pmr = θlδrq;
(d) sales quantity of remanufactured products Qmr = min {nh, nl};
(e) the OEM profit: Πmr = min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr).
Proposition 11 highlights two main points. First, the number of used products the
OEM acquires is just equal to the number of remanufactured products she offers. In
other words, the OEM does not have any incentive to acquire the used products more
than she requires for the remanufacturing. Second, when the OEM is a monopoly,
the price at which the OEM buys the used products is zero.
4.4.1.2 Competition
In the second stage of the second period, the OEM and the 3PR set prices and
quantities of the used products to be acquired, and prices and quantities of the re-







Qr (pr − cr)−Qupu
s.t. Qr ≤ Qu







Q̃r (p̃r − c̃r)− Q̃up̃u
s.t. Q̃r ≤ Q̃u
Qu + Q̃u ≤ nh,
(4.4.23)
respectively. The constraints in (4.4.22) imply that the OEM cannot remanufacture
more than the number of used products acquired by her and that the number of
used products acquired by her cannot exceed the number of used products available
in the market minus the number of used products acquired by the 3PR. Similarly,
the constraints in (4.4.23) imply that the 3PR cannot remanufacture more than the
number of used products acquired by him (the 3PR) and that the number of used
products acquired him cannot exceed the number of used products available in the
market minus the number of used products acquired by the OEM.
Proposition 12 outlines the equilibrium solution of the OEM’s problem (4.4.22)
and the 3PR’s problems (4.4.23). We denote the optimal solution by superscript c.
Proposition 12. In the competition, the following is the equilibrium solution:






, min {nh, nl}
nh
(θlδrq − cr)};
(b) quantity of used products acquired by the OEM: Qcu = nh if θlδrq− cr ≥ θlδ̃rq− c̃r;
else Qcu = 0;
(c) quantity of used products acquired by the 3PR: Q̃cu = 0 if θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r;
else Q̃cu = nh;
(d) quantity of remanufactured products sold by the OEM: Qcr = min {nh, nl} if
θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r; else Qcr = 0;
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(e) quantity of remanufactured products sold by the 3PR: Q̃cr = 0 if θlδrq − cr ≥
θlδ̃rq − c̃r; else Q̃cr = min {nh, nl};
(f) price of remanufactured products offered by the OEM: pcr = θlδrq;
(g) price of remanufactured products offered by the 3PR: p̃cr = θlδ̃rq;
(h) the OEM profit: Πcr = min {nh, nl}
[




if θlδrq − cr >
θlδ̃rq − c̃r; else Πcr = 0;
(i) the 3PR profit: Π̃cr = min {nh, nl}
[
θlδ̃rq − c̃r − (θlδrq − cr)
]




Note that when the OEM is a monopoly, the OEM sets the price of the used
product pmu = 0. In contrast, when the OEM faces competition from the 3PR, the
price of the used product is pcu > 0. Thus, competition for acquisition of the used
products raises the price of the used product (pcu > p
m
u ). Moreover, in the presence of
competition, each player has the incentive to deter the competition in remanufacturing
by acquiring all the used products even if the player does not remanufacture all the
used products. Finally, competition in acquisition of the used products reduces the
profit of the OEM from remanufacturing, that is, Πcr < Π
m
r . In particular, when
θlδrq−cr > θlδ̃rq−c̃r, the OEM’s profit from remanufacturing is positive but decreases
as the 3PR becomes more competitive1. Similarly, when θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r, the
3PR’s profit from remanufacturing is positive but decreases as the OEM becomes
more competitive. When θlδrq − cr = θlδ̃rq − c̃r, competition between the OEM and
the 3PR intensifies, and none of the player makes profit from remanufacturing.
4.4.2 Second Period: New Product
4.4.2.1 Monopoly
In the first stage of the second period, the OEM sets price of the new product and
sells it to the high segment, which already owns the used product. In the beginning
1We define competitiveness of a player by difference between the perceived quality of the reman-
ufactured product offered by the player minus her cost of remanufacturing.
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of the second period, a high segment consumer has three options. First, he can keep
the used product and receive a second-period net utility θhδq from using it. Second,
he can buy a new product at price p2 and sell the used product at a price p
m
u to the
OEM, thereby receiving a second-period net utility θhq− p2 + pmu . Third, he can buy
a remanufactured product offered by the OEM at price pmr and sell the used product
at a price pmu , thereby receiving a second-period net utility either θhδrq − pmr + pmu .
To induce a high-segment consumer to buy the new product again in the second
period, the OEM must set price of the new product in the second period such that
the consumer is not worse off buying the new product in the second period; that is,





Q2 (p2 − cn) + Πmr
s.t. θhq − p2 + pmu ≥ max {θhδq, θhδrq − pmr + pmu }
(4.4.24)
Note that in the monopoly pmu = 0 and p
m
r = θlδrq (Proposition 11). Proposition
13 outlines the equilibrium solution of the OEM’s problem (4.4.24).
Proposition 13. In the monopoly, the following is the equilibrium solution for the
new product offered in the second period:
(a) price of the new product: pm2 = θhq −max {θhδq, (θh − θl) δrq};
(b) the OEM profit: Πm2 = nh (θhq −max {θhδq, (θh − θl) δrq} − cn) + min {nh, nl}
(θlδrq − cr).
4.4.2.2 Competition
In the first stage of the second period, the OEM sets price of the new product and
sells it to the high segment, which already owns the used product. In the beginning
of the second period, a high segment consumer has three options. First, he can keep
the used product and receive a second-period net utility θhδq from using it. Second,




whoever pays a higher price between the OEM and the 3PR), thereby receiving a
second-period net utility θhq− p2 + pcu. Third, he can sell the used product at a price
pcu (i.e. to whoever pays a higher price) and buy a remanufactured product offered by
either the OEM at price pcr or the 3PR at price p̃
c
r, thereby receiving a second-period
net utility either θhδrq − pcr + pcu (when buying from the OEM) or θhδ̃rq − p̃cr + pcu
(when buying from the 3PR).
To induce a high-segment consumer to buy the new product again in the second
period, the OEM must set price of the new product in the second period such that
the consumer is not worse off buying the new product in the second period; that is,
θhq−p2+pcu ≥ max {θhδq, θhδrq − pcr + pcu} if θlδrq−cr ≥ θlδ̃rq−c̃r and θhq−p2+pcu ≥
max
{
θhδq, θhδ̃rq − p̃cr + pcu
}
if θlδrq−cr < θlδ̃rq−c̃r, where pcr = θlδrq and p̃cr = θlδ̃rq.





Q2 (p2 − cn) + Πcr
s.t. θhq − p2 + pcu ≥ max {θhδq, θhδrq − pcr + pcu} for θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r
θhq − p2 + pcu ≥ max
{
θhδq, θhδ̃rq − p̃cr + pcu
}
for θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r.
(4.4.25)
Proposition 14 outlines the equilibrium solution of the OEM’s problem (4.4.25).
Proposition 14. In the competition, the following is the equilibrium price of the new
product offered in the second period:
(a) pc2 = θhq −max {θhδq − pcu, (θh − θl) δrq} if θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r;
(b) pc2 = θhq −max
{
θhδq − pcu, (θh − θl) δ̃rq
}
if θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r.
Proposition 15 outlines the optimal profit of the OEM in the second period under
competition.
Proposition 15. In the competition, the following is the OEM profit in the second
period,








θhδq − (θh − θl) δrq and θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r or min {nh, nl}nh (θlδrq − cr) ≤ θhδq −
(θh − θl) δ̃rq and θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r;
(b) Πc2 = nh (θhq − (θh − θl) δrq − cn) + min {nh, nl}
(










> θhδq − (θh − θl) δrq and θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r;
(c) Πc2 = nh
(
θhq − (θh − θl) δ̃rq − cn
)
if min {nh, nl}
nh
(θlδrq − cr) > θhδq−(θh − θl) δrq
and θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r.
4.4.3 First Period
In the first period, the OEM sets price of the new product and sells it to the high
segment. If a high-segment consumer buys the new product in the first period, the
consumer again buys the new product in the second period at price p∗2 and sells the
used product at price p∗u; as a result, the consumer gets a net utility (1 + ρ) θhq−p1−
ρ (p∗2 − p∗u), where p∗2 = pm2 and p∗u = pmu in the monopoly and p∗2 = pc2 and p∗u = pcu in
the competition. On the other hand, if the consumer does not buy the new product
in the first period, he buys the new product at price p∗2; as a result, the consumer
gets a net utility ρ (θhq − p∗2).
To induce the consumer to buy in the first period, the OEM must set price of the
new product in the first period such that the consumer is not worse off buying the
new product in the first period; that is, (1 + ρ) θhq − p1 − ρ (p∗2 − p∗u) ≥ ρ (θhq − p∗2),
which yields θhq − p1 + ρp∗u ≥ 0. Thus, the maximum price the OEM can charge for
the new product in the first period is consumer’s utility from using the new product
in the first period plus the present value of the used product price (i.e. resale price





Q1 (p1 − cn) + ρΠ∗2
s.t. θhq − p1 + ρp∗u ≥ 0.
(4.4.26)
Proposition 16 outlines the equilibrium solution of the OEM’s problem (4.4.26).
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Proposition 16. The following is the equilibrium solution in the first period:
(a) the optimal price of the new product: p∗1 = θhq + ρp
∗
u;
(b) the optimal total profit of the OEM: Π∗t = nh (θhq + ρp
∗
u − cn) + ρΠ∗2,
















Since in the monopoly p∗u = p
m
u , the optimal new product price in the first period is
pm1 = θhq and the OEM profit Π
m
t = nh (θhq − cn)+ρ[nh(θhq−max {θhδq, (θh − θl) δrq}−
cn) + min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr)].
Similarly, in the competition p∗u = p
c
u and the optimal new product price in
the first period is pc1 = θhq + ρp
c
u and the OEM profit Π
c
t = nh (θhq + ρp
c
u − cn) +
ρ [nh (p
c
2 − cn) + min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr)] − ρnhpcu, where pc2 is the optimal price of
the new product in the second period (refer Proposition 14) and pcu is optimal price
of the used product (refer Proposition 12).
Proposition 17 outlines the effect of competition on overall profit of the OEM.
Proposition 17. Effect of competition from the 3PR on the OEM profit:
(a) Πct > Π
m
t if θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r and θhδq > (θh − θl) δrq or if θlδrq − cr <
θlδ̃rq − c̃r, θhδq > (θh − θl) δ̃rq;
(b) else Πct = Π
m
t .
The Proposition 17 states that the OEM is strictly better off (i.e. Πct > Π
m
t ) with
competition from the 3PR if either θhδq > (θh − θl) δrq and the OEM succeeds in
acquiring and remanufacturing the used products or θhδq > (θh − θl) δ̃rq and the 3PR
succeeds in acquiring and remanufacturing the used products. This implies that as
long as keeping the used product gives a higher utility than buying the remanufactured
product, the OEM is better off with competition; in that case, the OEM needs to
price the new product in the second period keeping in mind only the used product,
not the remanufactured product.
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The following example illustrates the situation in which competition from a third-
party remanufacturer benefits the OEM.
Example 1. Let θh = 0.8, θl = 0.5, nh = 1, nl = 1, q = 10, δ = 0.4, δr = 0.7,
δ̃r = 0.6, cn = 5.0, cr = 2, c̃r = 2 and ρ = 0.5.
Monopoly: The OEM optimally sets price of the used product at pmu = 0 and price of
the remanufactured product at pmr = 3.5, resulting in Π
m
r = 1.5. In the second period,
a high segment consumer has the following options: keep his used product, thereby
getting a net utility 3.2; buy the new product at price pm2 and sell the used product at
price pmu , thereby getting a net utility 8.0−pm2 +pmu = 8.0−pm2 ; buy the remanufactured
product at price pmr and sell the used product at price p
m
u , thereby getting a net utility
5.6 − pmr + pmu = 2.1. To incentivize the high segment consumer to buy the new
product again in the second period, the OEM optimally sets pm2 = 4.8 and, thus,
earns a second-period profit Πm2 = 1.3. In the first period, a high segment consumer’s
willingness to pay for the new product is sum of the utility he gets from using it in the
first period and the discounted used product price he gets in the second period. Thus,
the OEM optimally sets pm1 = 8.0 and, thus, earns a total profit Π
m
t = 3.65.
Competition: The OEM and the 3PR would earn 1.0− pu and 1.5− p̃u respectively
if they acquire the used products at price pu and p̃u respectively. In the equilibrium,
the OEM succeeds in acquiring and remanufacturing the used products. The OEM
optimally sets price of the used product at pcu = 1.0 and price of the remanufactured
product at pcr = 3.5, resulting in Π
c
r = 0.5 and Π̃
c
r = 0. In the second period, a high
segment consumer has the following options: keep his used product, thereby getting
a net utility 3.2; buy the new product at price pc2 and sell the used product at price
pcu, thereby getting a net utility 8.0 − pc2 + pcu = 9.0 − pc2; buy the remanufactured
product at price pcr and sell the used product at price p
c
u, thereby getting a net utility
5.6− pcr + pcu = 3.1. To incentivize the high segment consumer to buy the new product
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again in the second period, the OEM optimally sets pc2 = 5.8 and, thus, earns a second-
period profit Πc2 = 1.3. In the first period, a high segment consumer’s willingness to
pay for the new product is sum of the utility he get from using it in the first period
and the discounted value of used product price he get in the second period. Thus, the
OEM optimally sets pc1 = 8.0 + ρp
c
u = 8.5 and, thus, earns a total profit Π
c
t = 4.15.
A higher price of the used product enables the OEM charge a higher price for the
new product in the first period. Moreover, under certain conditions, a higher price of
the used product also enables the OEM charge a higher price for the new product in
the second period. However, the reasons are different. In the first period, consumers
are willing to pay a higher price for the new product because they expect a higher
resale price of the product in the second period. In the second period, consumers are
sometime willing to pay a higher price for the new products because in the second
period the higher price of the used products makes selling the used products more
attractive than keeping them.
If the OEM does not allow the entry of the third-party remanufacturer, the OEM
cannot credibly commit to future resale value of the new product (i.e. pu). If strategic
consumers anticipate lower resale value (or no resale value, to be specific) of the new
product, they lower their willingness to pay for the new product in the first period
and sometimes in the second period as well.
However, by allowing the entry of the third-party remanufacturer, the OEM sub-
jects herself to a competitive pressure from the third-party remanufacturer for acqui-
sition of the used products. The competition from the 3PR plays a crucial role: it
increases price of the used product and reassures consumers about the future resale
value of the new product (when the new product becomes a used product). This as-
surance of a higher resale value of the new products increases consumers’ willingness
to pay for the new products. In fact, the competition may have a positive spillover
effect on the prices of the new product in both the periods, increasing the profits from
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the new product sales. Though competition from the 3PR decreases the OEM’s prof-
its from the remanufacturing, the benefits for the OEM in the form of a higher price
of the new product can more than offset the losses in the remanufacturing. Thus,
overall, the competition from the 3PR may benefit the OEM.
The OEMs often consider third-party remanufacturers as a threat and try to deter
the entry of the third-party remanufacturers by various means such as designing their
products in such a way that it makes remanufacturing difficult and expensive for the
third-party remanufacturers. On the contrary, keeping the cost of remanufacturing
for the third-party remanufacturers low can actually benefit the OEM if it intensifies
the competition in acquisition of the used products. In conclusion, an OEM who
remanufactures used products can be better off with competition in remanufacturing
from an independent third-party remanufacturer.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS AND TABLES OF CHAPTER II
A.1. Proofs
A.1.1 Proposition 1
The integrated firm solves (4.4.21). First-order conditions (FOCs) with respect to




2 (q − p) = p (p− csq2), respectively. Solving










, p∗ = 1
cs
}




, p∗ = 1
cs
}
yields zero sales quan-








unique optimal solution since the Hessian matrix H is negative definite at this point.




, pI = 2
9cs
}
, and the optimal sales quantity











The OEM solves (2.4.2) at the selling stage. If the OEM accepts the contract offered







. The FOC for this problem
with respect to p yields p∗ = q+w
2
. Since the second order condition (SOC) for





< 0, the unique optimal solution is p∗ = q+w
2
and the















(w − csq2), respectively.
If the OEM rejects the contract and manufactures the product using her in-house















(1− kcsq)2 and Π∗s = 0, respectively.
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(1− kcsq)2, i.e., if w ≤ kcsq2.

A.1.3 Lemma 2
In the contract stage, the supplier solves (2.4.4). When q < 1
(2k−1)cs , the optimal
wholesale price is w∗ = kcsq




(1− kcsq)2 and Π∗s =
(k−1)csq2(1−csq)
2
, respectively. When q ≥ 1
(2k−1)cs , the
optimal wholesale price is w∗ = q+csq
2
2
, and the resulting profits of the OEM and the
supplier are Π∗o =
q
16
(1− csq)2 and Π∗s =
q
8
(1− csq)2, respectively. 
A.1.4 Lemma 3
In the design stage, the OEM solves (2.4.6). Let the case corresponding to the
constraint q < 1
(2k−1)cs be denoted by “Case 1” and the case corresponding to the
constraint q ≥ 1
(2k−1)cs be denoted by “Case 2”.
Case 1 yields the optimal solution q1 = 1
3kcs
, and the corresponding optimal profit
of the OEM is Π1o =
1
27kcs
. Note that q1 < 1
(2k−1)cs since k > 1. Case 2 yields
the optimal solution q2a = 1
(2k−1)cs when k < 2 and q
2b = 1
3cs
when k ≥ 2. The
corresponding optimal profit of the OEM is Π2ao =
(k−1)2
4(2k−1)3cs
when k < 2 and Π2bo =
1
108cs
when k ≥ 2.
To determine which of these quality choices (among q1, q2a, and q2b) is optimal
for the OEM, we need to compare the OEM’s profits corresponding to quality choices
q1 and q2a for k < 2, and quality choices q1 and q2b for k ≥ 2.
For k < 2, we have: Π1o−Π2ao = 127kcs−
(k−1)2
4(2k−1)3cs
. At k = 1,Π1o−Π2ao = 127kcs > 0. At
k = 2, Π1o−Π2ao = 154cs −
1
108cs









Thus, for k < 2, the optimal quality is qP = q1 = 1
3kcs
. The corresponding optimal







For k ≥ 2, we have: Π1o − Π2bo = 127kcs −
1
108cs
. For 2 ≤ k < 4, since Π1o > Π2bo ,
the optimal quality is qP = q1 = 1
3kcs
and, the corresponding optimal profits of the
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, respectively. For k ≥ 4,
since Π2bo ≥ Π1o, the optimal quality is qP = q2b = 13cs and, the corresponding optimal



















Since ΠPs |k<4 = k−127k2cs , we have:
∂ΠPs
∂k
|k<4 = − k−227k3cs and
∂2ΠPs
∂k2













|{2<k<4} < 0. Moreover, in the region
k < 4, the supplier’s profit attains its maximum value ΠPs =
1
108cs
at k = 2. Finally,
since ΠPs |k≥4 = 154cs , it follows that Π
P
s |k<4 < ΠPs |k≥4. 
A.1.5 Proposition 2





, respectively (Proposition 1). Also, under the price-only contract,
we have qP = 1
3kcs
when k < 4 and qP = 1
3cs
when k ≥ 4 (Lemma 3). Thus, qP < qI
for k < 4 and qP = qI for k ≥ 4. Moreover, QP = 1
3
when k < 4 and QP = 1
6
when
k ≥ 4 (Lemma 3). Thus, QP = QI for k < 4 and QP < QI for k ≥ 4.
We also know that ΠI = 1
27cs






for k < 4 and
∂ΠPt
∂k




k < 4. Moreover, when k ≥ 4, we have ΠPt = ΠPo + ΠPs = 136cs < Π
I . 
A.1.6 Lemma 4
In the selling stage, the OEM solves (2.4.7). If the OEM accepts the contract, the
unique optimal selling price is p∗ = q+w
2
. Substituting p∗ in (2.4.7) and (2.4.8),












(w − csq2) + f . If the
OEM manufactures using her in-house option, the unique optimal selling price is p∗ =
q+kcsq2
2




and Π∗s = 0. In the contract stage, the supplier solves (2.4.9), yielding w
∗ = csq
2 and
f ∗ = q
4
(1− csq)2 − q4 (1− kcsq)
2. The OEM’s profit is Π∗o =
q
4
(1− kcsq)2 and the
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supplier’s profit is Π∗s = f
∗. 
A.1.7 Lemma 5















Parts (a) to (d) of the Proposition follow algebraically from comparisons among the
optimal solutions for the integrated firm (Proposition 1), the price-only contract
(Lemma 3), and the two-part tariff contract (Lemma 5).







. For k < 4, we have
Π2Pt − ΠPt =
(k−1)2
108k3cs




Π2Pt − ΠPt |k=4 < 0 and
∂(Π2Pt −ΠPt )
∂k
|k≥4 < 0, we have Π2Pt − ΠPt < 0 for k ≥ 4. Finally,
since ΠPt < Π
I (Proposition 2(c)) and Π2Pt −ΠI = −
(4k−1)(k−1)2
108k3cs
< 0, part (e) follows.

A.1.9 Lemma 6
In the selling stage, for given q̃ and w̃, the OEM’s best response p̃∗ is the same as
that expressed in Lemma 1. In particular, if w̃ ≤ kjcsq̃2, OEM type j enters into the
contract with the supplier and sets selling price p̃∗ = q̃+w̃
2
. If w̃ > kjcsq̃
2, OEM type




. The optimal profit
of OEM type j for given q̃ and w̃ is expressed in (2.5.11).
If w̃ > khcsq̃
2, the OEM – regardless of her cost structure – rejects the con-
tract. Therefore, w̃ > khcsq̃
2 cannot be optimal for the supplier. In the range
klcsq̃
2 < w̃ ≤ khcsq̃2, the supplier can contract only with the high-cost OEM and,









In the range w̃ ≤ klcsq̃2, the supplier can contract with both the high- and the
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low-cost OEM. From Lemma 2(a) and the concavity of the supplier’s profit with
respect to w̃ (see (2.4.4) in §2.4.1), it follows that it is optimal for the supplier to set








Thus, the supplier’s optimal strategy is to choose w̃∗ from the space {w̃h (q̃) , w̃l (q̃)}.
The optimal mix within this space is discussed in Proposition 4. 
A.1.10 Lemma 7















, the following relationship holds: Pr(w̃l|q̃) = 1 − Pr(w̃h|q̃). In





































Similarly, the low-cost OEM solves (2.5.14), which, using the relationship kh > kl,























(1− klcsq̃)2 s.t. q̃ <
1






(1− csq̃)2 s.t. q̃ ≥
1
(2kl − 1) cs
.
Since kl < 4, using Lemma 3(a), we have that the low-cost OEM’s optimal choice
of quality is q̃l =
1
3klcs
, which is independent of the supplier’s strategy (choice of
wholesale price) in the contract stage. Thus, Pr(q̃l|kl) = 1.
Now, suppose that the high-cost OEM chooses quality q̃y such that q̃y 6= q̃l. On
observing quality q̃y, the supplier would know with certainty that he is facing the high-
cost OEM since Pr(q̃y|kl) = 0. In such a situation, the best response of the supplier
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, i.e., Pr(w̃hy|q̃y) = 1. Thus, the
high-cost OEM’s problem is max
q̃y





















6= q̃l, since kh < 4.
However, the high-cost OEM also has an incentive to choose q̃l instead of q̃h since
she earns a higher profit by choosing q̃l if the supplier happens to choose w̃ll = klcsq̃l
2.
Consequently, if the supplier observes q̃l, he is unable to perfectly identify the OEM’s
type. Thus, the high-cost OEM’s optimal strategy space is {q̃l, q̃h} and the supplier’s
optimal strategy is to offer w̃hh = khcsq̃h
2 if the OEM chooses q̃h, i.e., Pr(w̃hh|q̃h) = 1.

A.1.11 Proposition 4
After excluding the dominated strategies of the OEM and the supplier, the remaining
possible strategies and equilibria are as shown in Figure 4. To determine whether
an equilibrium is plausible, we check whether either the OEM or the supplier has
an incentive to unilaterally deviate from her or his strategy. The supplier and the
high-cost OEM solve (2.5.15) and (2.5.16), respectively.
Using the expressions in Table 6, we have the following: Π̃ho [q̃l, w̃ll] = Π̃
l
o [q̃l, w̃hl] =
Π̃lo [q̃l, w̃ll] > Π̃
h
o [q̃h, w̃hh] > Π̃
h
o [q̃l, w̃hl]. Also, Π̃
h
s [q̃h, w̃hh] > Π̃
l
s [q̃l, w̃hl] = 0 and
Π̃hs [q̃l, w̃ll] = Π̃
l
s [q̃l, w̃ll] > 0. Moreover, Π̃
h
s [q̃h, w̃hh] ≥ Π̃hs [q̃l, w̃ll] iff (kh − 1) (kl − 1) ≤
1.
Separating Equilibrium {{q̃h|kh, q̃l|kl} , {w̃hh|q̃h, w̃hl|q̃l}}: This equilibrium is implau-
sible since the supplier has an incentive to deviate from the strategy of choosing high
wholesale price (w̃hl) to choosing low wholesale price (w̃ll) if he observes high quality
(q̃l), i.e., Π̃
l
s[q̃l, w̃ll] > Π̃
l
s [q̃l, w̃hl] = 0.
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Separating Equilibrium {{q̃h|kh, q̃l|kl} , {w̃hh|q̃h, w̃ll|q̃l}}: This equilibrium is implau-
sible since the high-cost OEM has an incentive to deviate from choosing low quality
(q̃h) to choosing high quality (q̃l), i.e., Π̃
h
o [q̃l, w̃ll] > Π̃
h
o [q̃h, w̃hh].
Pooling Equilibrium {{q̃l|kh, q̃l|kl} , {w̃hh|q̃h, w̃hl|q̃l}}: This equilibrium is implausible
since the high-cost OEM has an incentive to deviate from choosing high quality (q̃l)
to choosing low quality (q̃h), i.e., Π̃
h
o [q̃h, w̃hh] > Π̃
h
o [q̃l, w̃hl].
Pooling Equilibrium {{q̃l|kh, q̃l|kl} , {w̃hh|q̃h, w̃ll|q̃l}}:
Since Π̃ho [q̃l, w̃ll] > Π̃
h
o [q̃h, w̃hh], the high-cost OEM does not have an incentive to
deviate from choosing high quality (q̃l). Moreover, the supplier would not have an in-
centive to deviate from choosing low wholesale price (w̃ll) to choosing high wholesale
price (w̃hl) on observing high quality (q̃l) if
αΠ̃hs [q̃l, w̃ll] + (1− α) Π̃ls [q̃l, w̃ll] > αΠ̃hs [q̃l, w̃hl] + (1− α) Π̃ls [q̃l, w̃hl] . (A.1.27)
Denote X = 2kl(kl−1)
(kh−1)(3kl−kh)
and Y = 8kl(kl−1)
(3kl−1)2
. When kh <
3kl+1
2
, (A.1.27) holds if
α < X, and when kh ≥ 3kl+12 , (A.1.27) holds if α < Y .

















Semiseparating Equilibrium {{{q̃h, q̃l} |kh, q̃l|kl} , {w̃hh|q̃h, {w̃hl, w̃ll} |q̃l}}:
In this equilibrium, the high-cost OEM and the supplier choose mixed strategies. The
high-cost OEM’s strategy is to randomize between choosing low quality (q̃h) and high
quality (q̃l). Similarly, on observing high quality (q̃l), the supplier’s optimal strategy
is to randomize between offering high wholesale price (w̃hl) and low wholesale price
(w̃ll).
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The high-cost OEM’s optimal strategy is to choose low quality (q̃h) with proba-
bility β∗ and high quality (q̃l) with probability (1− β∗) such that the supplier, on
observing high quality (q̃l), is indifferent between offering high wholesale price (w̃hl)
and low wholesale price (w̃ll), that is (see (2.5.15)),
α (1− β∗) Π̃hs [q̃l, w̃hl]+(1− α) Π̃ls [q̃l, w̃hl] = α (1− β∗) Π̃hs [q̃l, w̃ll]+(1− α) Π̃ls [q̃l, w̃ll] .
(A.1.28)
(A.1.28) yields β∗ = α−X
α(1−X) when kh <
3kl+1
2
and β∗ = α−Y






and Y = 8kl(kl−1)
(3kl−1)2
. When kh <
3kl+1
2
, we have 0 ≤ β∗ ≤ 1 for α ≥ X
, and when kh ≥ 3kl+12 , we have 0 ≤ β
∗ ≤ 1 for α ≥ Y . Thus, for ζm1 ∪ ζm2 , where
ζm1 =
{






, and ζm2 =
{





high-cost OEM chooses q̃h with probability β
∗ and q̃l with probability (1− β∗).
The supplier’s optimal strategy is to offer high wholesale price (w̃hl) with probabil-
ity γ∗ and low wholesale price (w̃ll) with probability (1− γ∗) such that the high-cost
OEM is indifferent between choosing low quality (q̃h) and high quality (q̃l), that is
(see (2.5.16)),
Π̃ho [q̃h, w̃hh] = γ
∗Π̃ho [q̃l, w̃hl] + (1− γ∗) Π̃ho [q̃l, w̃ll] . (A.1.29)












. Since we restrict our attention to kj < 4, γ
∗ always satisfies 0 ≤ γ∗ ≤ 1.
Thus, the semiseparating equilibrium {{{q̃h, q̃l} |kh, q̃l|kl} , {w̃hh|q̃h, {w̃hl, w̃ll} |q̃l}}
occurs for ζm1 ∪ ζm2 . 
A.1.12 Proposition 5
Using the expressions in Table 4 in Appendix A.2 for the scenario of complete informa-















































Within the asymmetric information scenario, we consider both the pooling equilib-
rium (i.e., for ζp) as well as the semiseparating equilibrium (i.e., for ζm1 ∪ ζm2).
Product Quality: In the pooling equilibrium, q̃A = 1
3klcs






















. Thus, q̃A > qPE .




∗, w̃∗] + (1− α) Π̃lo [q̃∗, w̃∗]
= α
[
β∗Π̃ho [q̃h, w̃hh] + (1− β∗)
(








In the pooling equilibrium (i.e, β∗ = 0 and γ∗ = 0), Π̃ho [q̃











> 0. In the semiseparating equilib-
rium, from (A.1.29) and (A.1.30) we get Π̃ho [q̃
∗, w̃∗] = 1
27khcs
and Π̃lo [q̃
∗, w̃∗] = 1
27klcs
,
yielding Π̃Ao − ΠPEo = 0.
Supplier Profit: The expected profit of the supplier is
Π̃As = α
[
β∗Π̃hs [q̃h, w̃hh] + (1− β∗)
(








In the pooling equilibrium (i.e, β∗ = 0 and γ∗ = 0), (A.1.31) yields Π̃As =
kl−1
27k2l cs







, which is > 0 if (kh − 1) (kl − 1) > 1. In



















, which again is > 0
if (kh − 1) (kl − 1) > 1. Thus, irrespective of the type of equilibrium, Π̃As > ΠPEs if
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(kh − 1) (kl − 1) > 1.
Total Supply-Chain Profit: The expected total supply-chain profit is Π̃At =
Π̃Ao + Π̃
A

































In the semiseparating equilibrium, we have Π̃At −Π
PE








which is > 0 if (kh − 1) (kl − 1) > 1. Thus, Π̃At > Π
PE
t either under the pooling equi-
librium (i.e., for ζp), or if (kh − 1) (kl − 1) > 1.
Contract Outcome: In the semiseparating equilibrium, if the supplier offers high
wholesale price (w̃hl) on observing high quality (q̃l) and the OEM happens to be
low-cost, contracting does not occur. 
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A.2. Tables
Table 2: Notation (1)
Description













Cost Parameter: Supplier cs
Cost Parameter: OEM kcs khcs klcs
Probability: OEM Type – – – α 1− α
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Quality qI qP q2P q̃A
Quantity QI QP Q2P Q̃A
Contract Parameters – wP w2P , f 2P w̃A
Selling Price pI pP p2P p̃A















Table 4: Complete Information: Price-only Contract
Case
Variable















































Table 5: Complete Information: Two-Part Tariff Contract
Variable
































Profit of OEM, Π̃jo [q̃











Π̃ho [q̃h, w̃hh] =
1
27khcs











































Π̃ho [q̃l, w̃ll] =
1
27klcs






































































w̃ll w/Pr (1− γ∗) if
q̃l
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PROOFS AND TABLES OF CHAPTER III
B.1. Notation: Strategy Space
In the Appendix, we use the following notation to simplify our discussion. The
possible product strategies of the firm are given by WXY , where W ∈ {N, ∅}, X ∈
{N, ∅}, and Y ∈ {RS, RA, ∅} denote whether the firm offers the new product in the
first period, the new product in the second period, and the refurbished product in
the second period, respectively. The subscript for R denotes whether Some (S) or
All (A) of the first-period returns are refurbished.





1st Period 2nd Period


























B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 6
For a given sales quantity of the new product in the first period q1, sales quantities
in the second period are given by:









We substitute q2 (~p) and qr (~p) in the firm’s Problem (3.3.18) and solve for p2 and
pr; note that Π2 is jointly concave in p2 and pr. The second period optimal prices
and sales quantities are summarized in Table 9 in Appendix B.2 (as functions of q1).
For simplicity, let µn = vn − (1 + α) cn and µr = vr − cr. Define ᾱ = (crvn/cnvr) − 1,
q
1
(α) = max {(µn−µr)/(vn−vr), µn/(vn+2αvr)}, and q̄1(α) = max {µn/vn, µr/vr}. We now
derive conditions under which the different product strategies are optimal in the
second period.
i) Product Line (q∗2 > 0, q
∗
r > 0): The first-order conditions (FOCs) of the firm’s
second-period Problem (3.3.18) yield q2 (q1) = (1/2) ((µn−µr)/(vn−vr)− q1) and qr (q1) =
((1+α)cnvr−crvn)/2vr(vn−vr), if αq1 > qr. The FOCs yield q2 (q1) = (vn(1−q1)−2αq1vr−(1+α)cn)/2vn
and qr (q1) = αq1, if αq1 = qr. Thus, if α > ᾱ and q1 < q1, we have q
∗
2 > 0 and q
∗
r > 0,
i.e., the firm offers the product line in the second period.
ii) Refurbished Only (q∗2 = 0, q
∗
r > 0): The FOCs yield qr (q1) = (vr(1−q1)−cr)/2vr if
αq1 > qr and q2 = 0, and yield qr (q1) = αq1 if αq1 = qr and q2 = 0. Thus, if α > ᾱ
and q
1
≤ q1 < q̄1, we have q∗2 = 0 and q∗r > 0, i.e., the firm offers only the refurbished
product in the second period.
iii) New Only (q∗2 > 0, q
∗
r = 0): The FOCs yield q2(q1) = (vn(1−q1)−(1+α)cn)/2vn if
0 < q1 < q̄1 and qr = 0. The FOCs yield q2 = µn/2vn if q1 = 0 (implying qr = 0).
Thus, if α ≤ ᾱ and q1 < q̄1, we have q∗2 > 0 and q∗r = 0., i.e., the firm offers only the
new product in the second period.
iv) None (q∗2 = 0, q
∗
r = 0): The FOCs yield q2(q1) < 0 and qr(q1) < 0 if q1 ≥ q̄1.
Thus, if q1 ≥ q̄1, we have q∗2 = 0 and q∗r = 0, i.e., the firm offers none of the products
in the second period. 
B.1.2 Proof of Proposition 7
We first present a result that narrows the set of strategies that could be optimal for
the firm.
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Theorem 2. The following product strategies are not optimal for the firm:
i) offering the new product in the first period and no product in the second period
(i.e., Strategy N∅∅, where q∗1 > 0, and q∗2 = q∗r = 0)
ii) offering no product in the first period and only the new product in the second period
(i.e., Strategy ∅N∅, where q∗1 = q∗r = 0, and q∗2 > 0).
Proof. We first show that Strategy ∅N∅ cannot be optimal because it is strictly dom-
inated by Strategy NN∅. Then we show that Strategy N∅∅ is suboptimal because it
results in nonpositive firm profit.
For Strategy NN∅, in which qr = 0, the optimal solutions are q∗1 = 2(1−ρ)µn/vn(4−3ρ),
q∗2 = µn(2−ρ)/2vn(4−3ρ), and Π
∗
NN∅ =
(µn(2−ρ))2/4vn(4−3ρ). For Strategy ∅N∅, in which
q1 = qr = 0, we have q
∗
2 = µn/2vn and Π
∗
∅N∅ =
ρµ2n/4vn < Π∗NN∅. Therefore, Strategy
∅N∅ is strictly dominated by Strategy NN∅ and cannot be optimal.
Next, suppose Strategy N∅∅ is optimal, where q2 = qr = 0. In the first period,
the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing is
located at θm = 1 − q∗1. By definition, in Strategy N∅∅, this marginal consumer
obtains zero utility from buying the new product, i.e., p∗1 = vnθm= vn (1− q∗1). In
the second period, the firm will have no incentive to sell the new product to any
consumer with θ ≤ θm if vnθm ≤ (1 + α) cn. Combining these two conditions, we
obtain p∗1 ≤ cn (1 + α), implying that the firm makes nonpositive profit. Therefore,
Strategy N∅∅ is suboptimal. 
Theorem 2 shows that the firm should always offer the new product in the first
period and the new and/or the refurbished product in the second period. From
Proposition 6, this implies that q1 < q̄1. The remaining feasible product strategies
are listed in Table 10 (note that Table 9 provides the corresponding optimal second-
period quantities and prices for the strategies listed in Table 10). Conditions for the
different second-period product strategies listed in the statement of Proposition 7 are
derived below:
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i) New Only: Let vNr (α) = vncr/(1+α)cn. Observe that vr ≤ vNr =⇒ α ≤ ᾱ =
(crvn/cnvr)− 1. Thus, from Proposition 6 (iii), when α ≤ ᾱ and q1 < q̄1, the firm offers
only the new product in the second period.
ii) Product Line: The firm offers both the new and the refurbished products in the




2 > 0) if




vr (1 + α) cn
vn
− 4α (1− ρ) vr(vn − vr)µn
v2n (4− 3ρ)
vRSr (α) = vn −
vn (4− 3ρ) ((1 + α) cn − cr)
vn (4− 3ρ)− 2 (1− ρ)µn
The firm offers both the new and the refurbished products in the second period,




2 > 0) if cr ≤ c̄r and the
following condition holds:
2vn(vn + 2αvr) ((1− ρ)µn + ρα ([vr(1+α)cn/vn]− cr))
µn (v2n (4− 3ρ) + 4ρα2vr (vn − vr))
< 1 (B.1.32)
Roots of (B.1.32) at equality are X +
√














where ce = (1 + α) cn. Since X
2 − Y = −vn ((2− ρ)µn + 2ραcr) /4ρα2 < 0, the only
nonnegative root is vRAr (α) = X +
√
Y , and (B.1.32) holds when vr < v
RA
r (α).






. It is straightforward to show that vRAr ≥
vRSr ⇐⇒ cr ≤ c̄r. Therefore, when vRAr < vRSr (implying cr > c̄r), the firm offers the
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r . On the other hand,
when vRAr ≥ vRSr (implying cr ≤ c̄r), the firm offers the product line, refurbishing




r . From part (i) above, only the new product is
offered if vr ≤ vNr . Thus, the firm offers the product line in the second period if
vNr < vr < v
R
r .
iii) Refurbished Only : When vr > v
R
r , we have q
∗
2 = 0 and q
∗
r > 0. Thus, the firm
offers only the refurbished product in the second period. Note that some or all of the
returns may be refurbished under this strategy. 
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 8
New Product in the Second Period. We first show that if the firm can commit
to its future decisions, it is never optimal for the firm to offer the new product in the
second period, that is, qC2 = 0. In the second period, there are three possibilities:
Case (i) qr = 0; Case (ii) αq1 > qr > 0; Case (iii) αq1 = qr > 0. We show that in
each of these cases, qC2 = 0.
Case (i): When qr = 0, the FOCs of the firm’s Problem (3.5.20) yield q1(q2) =
µn/2vn − ρq2 with corresponding profit Π(q2) =(µ2n − 4ρ (1− ρ) q22v2n)/4vn. Since Π
decreases in q2, we have the optimal q
C
2 = 0.
Case (ii): When αq1 > qr > 0, the FOCs yield q2 = (vncr − vr (1 + α) cn)/2vn (vn − vr)
and qr = ((1 + α) cnvr −crvn) / 2vn (vn − vr). Observe that qr > 0 ⇒ q2 < 0. There-
fore, the optimal qC2 = 0.





if cr < c̃r
−αvr(vn−(1+α)cn)
2v2n
if cr ≥ c̃r
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where c̃r = vr(vncn(1+α)−α(vn−vr)µn)/v2n. Observe that: (i) ∂q2/∂cr > 0 for cr < c̃r; (ii)





q2 < 0 ∀cr, and the optimal qC2 = 0.
Refurbished Product in the Second Period. Since the firm optimally does not
offer the new product in the second period in the commitment scenario, we substitute







i): If α ≤ ᾱ = (crvn/cnvr) − 1, then qr ≤ 0. Therefore, the optimal qCr = 0, i.e., the
firm does not offer the refurbished product in the second period.
ii): If α > ᾱ, we have αq1 > qr > 0 if αρv
2
r−vrA−crvn < 0, where A = α (vn + ρcr)−







optimal qCr < αq
C
1 , i.e., the firm refurbishes some of the returns in the second period.
iii): If α > ᾱ and vr ≥ v̄r, we have qr > αq1. Therefore, the optimal qCr = αqC1 , i.e.,
the firm refurbishes all of the returns in the second period. 
B.1.4 Proof of Proposition 9
Profit Comparison. To show Π∗ ≤ ΠC, we follow the logic in Bulow (1986, p. 733).
Note that in the commitment scenario, the firm sets prices for both the periods at
the beginning of the first period. Therefore, in the commitment scenario, the firm’s
Problem (3.5.20) is solved as a one-shot game between the firm and consumers.
In contrast, in the no-commitment scenario, the firm sets prices for the second
period at the beginning of the second period; this problem is given in (3.3.2). Thus,
the solution for the complete two-period Problem (3.3.19) in the no-commitment
scenario must be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Let S be the set of feasible solutions {p1, p2, pr} in the no-commitment scenario
and SC be the set of feasible solutions in the commitment scenario. Clearly, S ⊆ SC .
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Therefore, Π∗ ≤ ΠC.
Threshold Return Rate αc. In the commitment scenario (where the optimal















. The (tight) upper bounds on
the return rate α for Strategies N∅∅, N∅RS, and N∅RA to be feasible, are (vn−cn)/cn,
(vn−cn)/cn and (vn−cn)/(cn−ρ(vr−cr)), respectively. Note that (vn−cn)/cn < (vn−cn)/(cn−ρ(vr−cr)).
Thus, if α ≥ (vn−cn)/cn, only Strategy N∅RA is feasible, that is, qC2 = 0 and αqC1 =
qCr > 0.
In the no-commitment scenario, there are five possible product strategies (see
Table 10). The (tight) upper bounds on the return rate α for these strategies are
as follows: (vn−cn)/cn for Strategy NNRA and Strategy NN∅, ((vn−cn)−(vr−cr))/cn for
Strategy NNRS, ((vn−cn)−ρ(vr−cr))/cn for Strategy N∅RS, and (vn−cn)/(cn−ρ(vr−cr)) for
Strategy N∅RA. Note that ((vn−cn)−(vr−cr))/cn < ((vn−cn)−ρ(vr−cr))/cn < (vn−cn)/cn <
(vn−cn)/(cn−ρ(vr−cr)). Thus, if α ≥ (vn−cn)/cn, only Strategy N∅RA is feasible, that is,





Thus, if α ≥ (vn−cn)/cn = αc, only Strategy N∅RA is feasible in both the com-
mitment and the no-commitment scenarios, and the profits are identical in the two
scenarios, i.e., Π∗ = ΠC . This is because, when α ≥ αc, the new product is optimally
not offered in the second period in the no-commitment scenario as well. 
B.1.5 Proof of Proposition 10
Commitment Scenario. We consider the following exhaustive cases:




C/∂α = −cnqC1 < 0.





cn (vn − ρvr) + ρ (cr (vn + ρvrα) + vrα (vn − ρvr))




Case (iii) If αq1 > qr > 0, we have:
∂ΠC
∂α
= −cnqC1 < 0
No-Commitment Scenario. To prove the possible non-monotonicity of firm profit
Π∗ with respect to α, we restrict our attention to situations in which the firm refur-
bishes all of the returns. That is, αq1 = qr > 0, making it more likely for the optimal
profit Π∗ in the no-commitment scenario to approach the optimal profit ΠC in the
commitment scenario (using Proposition 9).
When αq1 = qr > 0 in the no-commitment scenario, the firm follows one of the




r > 0, q
∗
2 > 0) or Strategy N∅RA (i.e.
αq∗1 = q
∗
r > 0, q
∗
2 = 0). For these situations, we show that: (i) Π
∗ is decreasing in α
at α = 0+, and (ii) there exist v̂r, αs such that Π
∗ increases in α at αs for vr > v̂r.
(i) When α→ 0+, Strategy NNRA is always optimal and we have:
Π∗ =





(vn − cn) (cn (4 (1− ρ) (vn − ρvr) + ρ2vn) + 4crvnρ (1− ρ))
2v2n (4− 3ρ)
< 0
(ii) We know from Proposition 9 that when α ≥ αc, the firm’s profit in the no-
commitment scenario equals the profit in the commitment scenario. This is because,
when α ≥ αc, the new product is optimally not offered in the second period in the
no-commitment scenario as well. Therefore, we focus on the value of α beyond which
the firm can implicitly commit that q∗2 = 0 and, thus, where Π
∗ is liable to increase
in α (approaching the optimal profit ΠC in the commitment scenario). Accordingly,




µsn (vn (2− ρ) (µsn − αscn)− 2αsvr (1− ρ)µsn − 2αsvr ((1− ρ) (vn − cn) + αscn))
2αs (vn + 2αsvr)
2 .
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The right hand side is > 0 when
vr > v̂r =
vn (2− ρ) (µsn − αscn)
2αs (2 (1− ρ)µsn + (2− ρ)αscn)

B.2. Optimal Quantities and Prices
Table 9: Optimal Sales Quantities and Prices in the Second Period for a given q1

















vn (1− q1) + (1 + α) cn
2
q∗r =
(1 + α) cnvr − crvn
2vr (vn − vr)
p∗r =




vn (1− q1)− 2αq1vr − (1 + α) cn
2vn
p∗2 =
vn (1− q1) + (1 + α) cn
2










vr (1− q1)− cr
2vr
p∗r =




q∗r = αq1 p
∗
r = vr (1− q1 − αq1)
NN∅
q∗2 =
vn (1− q1)− (1 + α) cn
2vn
p∗2 =




vn − (1 + α) cn
2vn
p∗2 =





















vn (1− ρ)µn + ρα (vr (1 + α) cn − vncr)








































PROOFS AND TABLES OF CHAPTER IV
C.1. Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 11
Since, the OEM is a monopoly both in the acquisition of the used products and in
the selling of the remanufactured products, she extracts whole consumer surplus from
both the high-segment consumers, who sell the used products, and the low-segment
consumers, who buy the remanufactured products. Thus, the OEM optimally sets
pmu = 0 and p
m
r = θlδrq.
Since θlδrq − cr > pmu , the OEM has an incentive to sell as many remanufactured
products as she can. The number of remanufactured products the OEM can sell
is constrained by either the quantity of the used products (i.e. supply constraint)
available or the size of the low-segment market (i.e. demand constraint) or both.
Thus, Qmr = min {nh, nl}. Moreover, the OEM has no incentive to acquire more
than the number of used products she is going to remanufacture, that is, Qmu = Q
m
r .
Substituting the optimal solution in the OEM’s profit function Πr = Qr (pr − cr) −
Qupu yields optimal profit as shown in Proposition 11(e).
C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 12
Suppose nh ≤ nl. Since nh ≤ nl, the OEM and the 3PR have sufficient number
of low-segment consumers available to sell their remanufactured products and, thus,
can extract whole surplus from the low segment. Therefore, the OEM and the 3PR
optimally set pcr = θlδrq and p̃
c
r = θlδ̃rq, respectively, for their remanufactured prod-
ucts. As long as θlδrq − cr > pu and θlδ̃rq − c̃r > p̃u, the OEM and the 3PR have
incentives to sell as many remanufactured products as they can. Since nh ≤ nl, the
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number of remanufactured products a player can sell is constrained by the quantity
of the used products (supply constraint) she acquires. Thus, the OEM and the 3PR
optimally set Qcr = Qu and Q̃
c
r = Q̃u.
Since nh ≤ nl, the supply of the used products is constrained and each player
competes to acquire as many used products as she can by setting acquisition price of
the used products. Consumers sell their used products to a player who pays a higher
price. When both the players set the same price, we assume that consumers sell their
used products to the OEM. This is a reasonable assumption since OEMs usually have
a greater access to used products. Thus,
Qu =

nh if pu ≥ p̃u





0 if pu ≥ p̃u
nh if pu < p̃u
. (C.1.34)
Each player has an incentive to set lowest price but high enough to acquire all the
used products as long as the player makes nonnegative profit. Thus, the OEM’s
objective is to minimize pu such that pu ≥ p̃u and pu ≤ θlδrq − cr. Similarly, the
3PR’s objective is to minimize p̃u such that p̃u > pu and p̃u ≤ θlδ̃rq − c̃r.
We can easily show that when θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r, the equilibrium price of
the used product is pcu = θlδ̃rq − c̃r, and the corresponding number of used products
acquired and remanufactured by the OEM and the 3PR are Qcu = Q
c
r = nh and
Q̃cu = Q̃
c
r = 0 respectively. Similarly, when θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r, the equilibrium
price of the used product is pcu = θlδrq − cr, and the corresponding number of used
products acquired and remanufactured by the OEM and the 3PR are Qcu = Q
c
r = 0
and Q̃cu = Q̃
c
r = nh respectively.
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Suppose nh > nl. If the total number of remanufactured products offered by the
OEM and the 3PR combined is more than the number of low-segment consumers
available, the equilibrium price of the remanufactured products are pcr = 0 and p̃
c
r = 0,
respectively, and each player makes negative profit. Therefore, in the equilibrium, the
total number of the remanufactured products by the OEM and the 3PR combined
is Qcr + Q̃
c
r = nl and, thus, the OEM and the 3PR set p
c
r = θlδrq and p̃
c
r = θlδ̃rq,
respectively. As long as θlδrq − cr > pu and θlδ̃rq − c̃r > p̃u, the OEM and the
3PR have incentives to sell as many remanufactured products as they can. Since
nh > nl, the number of remanufactured products a player can sell is either constrained
by the number of used products (supply constraint) she acquires or the remaining
market size (nl − Q̃r for the OEM and nl − Qr for the 3PR). Thus, the OEM’s
and the 3PR’s best responses are to remanufacture Qr = min
{







respectively. Note that the optimal solution may have
multiple Nash equilibria if Qu > 0, Q̃u > 0 & Qu + Q̃u > nl.
Since consumers sell their used products to a player who pays a higher price
(along with the assumption that consumers sell their used products to the OEM
when pu = p̃u), either Qu = 0 & Q̃u = 0, and, thus, we get unique Nash equilibria.
Thus, expressions (C.1.33) and (C.1.34) also apply when nh > nl. Each player has an
incentive to set lowest price but high enough to acquire all the used products as long
as the player makes nonnegative profit. Thus, the OEM’s objective is to minimize
pu such that pu ≥ p̃u and nhpu ≤ nl (θlδrq − cr). Similarly, the 3PR’s objective is to





We can easily show that when θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r, the equilibrium price of






; the corresponding number of used products
acquired and remanufactured by the OEM are Qcu = nh and Q
c
r = nl respectively, and
by the 3PR are Q̃cu = 0 and Q̃
c
r = 0 respectively. Similarly, when θlδrq−cr < θlδ̃rq−c̃r,
the equilibrium price of the used product is pcu =
nl
nh
(θlδrq − cr); the corresponding
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number of used products acquired and remanufactured by the OEM are Qcu = 0 and
Qcr = 0 respectively, and by the 3PR are Q̃
c
u = nh and Q̃
c
r = nl respectively.












the optimal solution in the OEM’s profit function Πr = Qr (pr − cr) − Qupu yields
optimal profit as shown in Proposition 12(h). Similarly, substituting the optimal
solution in the 3PR’s profit function Π̃r = Q̃r (p̃r − c̃r) − Q̃up̃u yields optimal profit
as shown in Proposition 12(i).
Table 12 summarizes outcome of the acquisition and remanufacturing of the used
products under competition.
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 13
If the high segment consumer keeps the used product, he receives a second-period net
utility θhδq from using it. If the consumer buys the new product at price p2 and sells
the used product at price pmu , he receives a second-period net utility θhq− p2 + pmu . If
the consumer sells the used product at price pmu and buys the OEM’s remanufactured
product at price pmr , he receives a second-period net utility θhδrq − pmr + pmu . To
induce the consumer to buy the new product again in the second period, the OEM
must set the price of the new product in the second period such that the consumer is
not worse off buying the new product in the second period; that is, θhq − p2 + pmu ≥
max {θhδq, θhδrq − pmr + pmu }. Thus, the OEM solves (4.4.24).
We know that in the monopoly pmu = 0 and p
m
r = θlδrq (Proposition 11). More-
over, the OEM would like to set price of the new product as high as possible given the
constraint. Thus, the OEM optimally sets pm2 = θhq−θhδq if θhδq ≥ (θh − θl) δrq and
pm2 = θhq−(θh − θl) δrq if θhδq < (θh − θl) δrq. Thus, pm2 = θhq−max {θhδq, (θh − θl) δrq}.
Moreover, optimal sales quantity is Qm2 = nh. Thus, the optimal profit of the OEM is
Πm2 = nh (θhq −max {θhδq, (θh − θl) δrq} − cn)+min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr), as shown
in Proposition 13(b).
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C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 14
If the high segment consumer keeps the used product, he receives a second-period net
utility θhδq from using it. If the consumer buys the new product at price p2 and sells
the used product at price pcu, he receives a second-period net utility θhq − p2 + pcu. If
the consumer sells the used product at price pcu and buys the OEM’s remanufactured
product at price pcr, he receives a second-period net utility θhδrq − pcr + pcu. If the
consumer sells the used product at price pcu and buys the 3PR’s remanufactured
product at price p̃cr, he receives a second-period net utility θhδ̃rq − p̃cr + pcu. To
induce the consumer to buy the new product again in the second period, the OEM
must set the price of the new product in the second period such that the consumer
is not worse off buying the new product in the second period; that is, θhq − p2 +
pcu ≥ max {θhδq, θhδrq − pcr + pcu} if θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r and θhq − p2 + pcu ≥
max
{
θhδq, θhδ̃rq − p̃cr + pcu
}
if θlδrq−cr < θlδ̃rq−c̃r, where pcr = θlδrq and p̃cr = θlδ̃rq.
Thus, the OEM solves (4.4.25).
Note that the OEM would like to set price of the new product as high as possi-
ble given the constraints. Thus, the OEM optimally sets pc2 = θhq − max {θhδq −
pcu, (θh − θl) δrq} if θlδrq−cr ≥ θlδ̃rq−c̃r and pc2 = θhq−max
{
θhδq − pcu, (θh − θl) δ̃rq
}
if θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r, where pcu is the optimal price of the used product in the
competition (refer Proposition 12).
C.1.5 Proof of Proposition 15





2 − cn) + min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr) − nhpcu, where pcu is the optimal price of the
used product in the competition (refer Proposition 12) and pc2 is the optimal price of
the new product of the second period in the competition (refer Proposition 14).













≥ (θh − θl) δrq,
then pc2 = θhq −
(




and Πc2 = nh (θhq − θhδq − cn) +
min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr).




< (θh − θl) δrq, then
pc2 = θhq− (θh − θl) δrq and Πc2 = nh (θhq − (θh − θl) δrq − cn) + min {nh, nl} (θlδrq−
cr − θlδ̃rq − c̃r).
Note that if θlδrq−cr < θlδ̃rq−c̃r, then pc2 = θhq−max
{






(θlδrq − cr) (14(b)).
If θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r and θhδq − min {nh, nl}nh (θlδrq − cr) ≥ (θh − θl) δ̃rq,
then pc2 = θhq −
(
θhδq − min {nh, nl}nh (θlδrq − cr)
)
and Πc2 = nh (θhq − θhδq − cn) +
min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr).
If θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r and θhδq − min {nh, nl}nh (θlδrq − cr) < (θh − θl) δ̃rq, then
pc2 = θhq − (θh − θl) δ̃rq and Πc2 = nh
(
θhq − (θh − θl) δ̃rq − cn
)
.
C.1.6 Proof of Proposition 16
If a high-segment consumer buys the new product in the first period, the consumer
again buys the new product in the second period at price p∗2 and sells the used product
at price p∗u; as a result, the consumer gets a net utility (1 + ρ) θhq − p1 − ρ (p∗2 − p∗u).
If the consumer does not buy the new product in the first period, he has the following
four options in the second period: (i) buy the new product at price p∗2 and thereby get
a net utility ρ (θhq − p∗2); (ii) buy the remanufactured product offered by the OEM
(if θlδrq− cr ≥ θlδ̃rq− c̃r) at price p∗r and thereby get a net utility ρ (θhδrq − p∗r); (iii)
buy the remanufactured product offered by the 3PR (if θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r) at




; (iv) buy none and thereby get
zero utility.
From the second period analysis, we already know that at optimality θhq − p∗2 +




θhδq, θhδ̃rq − p̃∗r + p∗u
}
if θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r; that is, θhq − p∗2 ≥ θhδrq − p∗r
if θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r and θhq − p∗2 ≥ δ̃rq − p̃∗r if θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r.
To induce the consumer to buy the new product in the first period, the OEM must
set price of the new product in the first period such that the consumer is not worse
off buying the new product in the first period; that is, (1 + ρ) θhq− p1− ρp∗2 + ρp∗u ≥
ρ (θhq − p∗2) or θhq − p1 + ρp∗u ≥ 0. Thus, the OEM solves (4.4.26).
Since, the OEM would like to set price of the new product as high as possible
given the constraint θhq − p1 + ρp∗u ≥ 0, the OEM optimally sets p∗1 = θhq + ρp∗u.
Moreover, optimal sales quantity is Q∗1 = nh. Substituting the optimal solution in
Π1 = Q1 (p1 − cn) + ρΠ∗2 yields optimal profit of the OEM as shown in Proposition
16(b).
C.1.7 Proof of Proposition 17
In the monopoly, the optimal first period price of the new product is pm1 = θhq and
the OEM profit
Πmt = nh (θhq − cn) + ρ [nh (θhq −∆m − cn) + min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr)] ,
where
∆m = max {θhδq, (θh − θl) δrq} .
Moreover, let K = nh (θhq − cn) + ρ(nh (θhq − cn) + min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr)). Then
Πmt = K − ρnh∆m.
Similarly, in the competition, the optimal first period price of the new product is
pc1 = θhq + ρp
c
u and the OEM profit
Πct = nh (θhq + ρp
c
u − cn) + ρ [nh (pc2 − cn) + min {nh, nl} (θlδrq − cr)]− ρnhpcu.
Let ∆c = pc2− θhq, where pc2 is optimal second period price of the new product in the
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, (θh − θl) δrq
}
if θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r,
max
{
θhδq − min {nh, nl}nh (θlδrq − cr) , (θh − θl) δ̃rq
}
if θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r.
Then Πct = K − ρnh∆c.
Thus, Πct = Π
m
t + ρnh (∆
m −∆c). Therefore Πct ≥ Πmt if and only if ∆m ≥ ∆c.
Assuming δr ≥ δ̃r, we establish relationship between Πct and Πmt for each parameter
setting as follows:




≥ (θh − θl) δrq,






















then ∆c = (θh − θl) δrq and ∆m = θhδq. Thus, Πct = Πmt +ρnh (θhδq − (θh − θl) δrq) >
Πmt .
If θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r and (θh − θl) δrq ≥ θhδq, then ∆c = (θh − θl) δrq and
∆m = (θh − θl) δrq. Thus, Πct = Πmt .
If θlδrq−cr < θlδ̃rq− c̃r, θhδq−min {nh, nl}nh (θlδrq − cr) ≥ (θh − θl) δ̃rq, and θhδq >
(θh − θl) δrq, then ∆c = θhδq − min {nh, nl}nh (θlδrq − cr) and ∆






(θlδrq − cr)] > Πmt .
If θlδrq−cr < θlδ̃rq− c̃r, θhδq−min {nh, nl}nh (θlδrq − cr) ≥ (θh − θl) δ̃rq, and θhδq ≤
(θh − θl) δrq, then ∆c = θhδq− min {nh, nl}nh (θlδrq − cr) and ∆









+ ρnh [(θh − θl) δrq − θhδq] > Πmt .
If θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r, and θhδq > (θh − θl) δrq ≥ (θh − θl) δ̃rq > θhδq −
min {nh, nl}
nh
(θlδrq − cr), then ∆c = (θh − θl) δ̃rq and ∆m = θhδq. Thus, Πct = Πmt +
θhδq − (θh − θl) δ̃rq > Πmt .




(θlδrq − cr), then ∆c = (θh − θl) δ̃rq and ∆m = (θh − θl) δrq. Thus, Πct =
Πmt + ρnh
[
(θh − θl) δrq − (θh − θl) δ̃rq
]
> Πmt .
If θlδrq−cr < θlδ̃rq−c̃r, (θh − θl) δrq ≥ (θh − θl) δ̃rq ≥ θhδq, then ∆c = (θh − θl) δ̃rq
and ∆m = (θh − θl) δrq. Thus, Πct = Πmt + ρnh
[
(θh − θl) δrq − (θh − θl) δ̃rq
]
≥ Πmt .
In conclusion, Πct > Π
m
t if θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r and θhδq > (θh − θl) δrq or if





q Quality of new product
cn Marginal cost of producing new product
p1 (p2) Price of new product in first (second) period
Q1 (Q2) Sales quantity of new product in first (second) period
ρ Discount factor for second period
δq Quality of used product










Quality of remanufactured product offered by OEM
(3PR)
cr (c̃r) Cost of remanufacturing for OEM (3PR)





Sales quantity of remanufactured product offered by
OEM (3PR)
h (l) High-end (low-end) consumer segment
θh (θl) Willingness to pay of high-end (low-end) consumer
segment
nh (nl) Number of consumers in high-end (low-end) consumer
segment
Πt Total profit of OEM





Profit of OEM (3PR) from acquisition and
remanufacturing of used product
m (c) Superscript to represent an optimal solution in the
monopoly (competition)
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nh ≤ nl nh nh θlδrq 0 0 −− θlδ̃rq − c̃r
θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r




nh ≤ nl 0 0 −− nh nh θlδ̃rq θlδrq − cr
θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r
nh > nl 0 0 −− nh nl θlδ̃rq nlnh (θlδrq − cr)
Table 13: Solution for New Product of the Second Period in Competition
Optimal Price Constraints
pc2 = θhq − (θhδq − pcu) θhδq − pcu ≥ (θh − θl) δrq θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r
pc2 = θhq − (θhδq − pcu) θhδq − pcu ≥ (θh − θl) δ̃rq θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r
pc2 = θhq − (θh − θl) δrq θhδq − pcu < (θh − θl) δrq θlδrq − cr ≥ θlδ̃rq − c̃r
pc2 = θhq − (θh − θl) δ̃rq θhδq − pcu < (θh − θl) δ̃rq θlδrq − cr < θlδ̃rq − c̃r
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